#Human #infection with #avian #influenza A (#H5N8) – the #Russian Federation (@WHO, edited)

[Source: World Health Organization (WHO), full page: (LINK). Edited.]

Human infection with avian influenza A (H5N8) – the Russian Federation

Disease Outbreak News | 26 February 2021

On 18 February 2021, the National IHR Focal Point for the Russian Federation notified WHO of detection of avian influenza A(H5N8) in seven human clinical specimens.

These are the first reported detection of avian influenza A(H5N8) in humans.

Positive clinical specimens were collected from poultry farm workers who participated in a response operation to contain an avian influenza A(H5N8) outbreak detected in a poultry farm in Astrakhan Oblast in the Russian Federation.

The laboratory confirmation of the seven specimens were performed by the State Research Centre for Virology and Biotechnology VECTOR (WHO H5 Reference Laboratory). The age of seven positive cases ranged between 29 to 60 years and five were female.

Between 3 and 11 December, a total of 101 000 of 900 000 egg laying hens on the farm died. This high mortality rate prompted an investigation. Samples were collected from these birds and an initial detection of avian influenza A(H5N8) was performed by the Russian regional veterinary laboratory.

On 11 December, the outbreak was confirmed by the World Organisation for Animal Health (OIE) Reference laboratory, and the Federal Centre for Animal Health (FGBI-ARRIAH), in Vladimir, the Russian Federation. Outbreak containment operations started immediately and continued for several days due to the large size of the poultry farm.

The cases remained asymptomatic for the whole follow up duration (several weeks). Follow-up nasopharyngeal swabs were collected during medical observation period and were tested negative for avian influenza A(H5N8).

No obvious clinical manifestations were reported from any farm workers under medical surveillance, their family members, or other close contacts of the seven cases.

Additionally, acute and convalescent sera was collected from the seven positive human cases for serological testing. The results were suggestive of recent infection.

Influenza A(H5N8) viruses isolated from this poultry outbreak in Astrakhan belonged to clade 2.3.4.4b of avian influenza A(H5Nx) viruses.

In 2020, avian influenza A (H5N8) viruses were also detected in poultry or wild birds in Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Egypt, Germany, Hungary, Iraq, Japan, Kazakhstan, the Netherlands, Poland, Romania, the United Kingdom, and the Russian Federation.

 

Public health response

On receiving the initial signal of a probable outbreak of highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) at the poultry farm on 3 December 2020, the national authorities took immediate measures including cessation of poultry production cycles, and product transportation from the affected farm.

Between 11 and 18 December, several measures including culling and disposing of poultry, eggs, litter and disinfection of contaminated premises were taken as part of outbreak response activities

During and after the culling of all the poultry, nasopharyngeal swabs and serum samples were collected from poultry farm workers and personnel involved in outbreak response at the farm. The surveillance activities, both within and outside of the containment area, was intensified. A total of 24 close contacts of the confirmed cases have been identified and traced.

In total, 150 individuals were monitored for clinical indication of respiratory disease and received antiviral prophylaxis therapy.

No symptoms were reported among these individuals.

Whole Genome Sequencing of avian influenza A (H5N8) viruses isolated from poultry and from one of the seven human cases was performed and were uploaded to the Global Initiative on Sharing All Influenza Data (GISAID) database on 20 February 2021.

Genetic and phenotypic characterization of the virus is ongoing.

WHO is following up with the public health authorities in the Russian Federation, including implementation of public health measures warranted by such events, and with the WHO Global Influenza Surveillance and Response System (GISRS) on further analysis and assessment of the virus materials and serum samples. On 20 February, a special briefing by the head of the Federal Service for Surveillance on Consumer Rights Protection and Human Wellbeing was organized for the state Russian media to inform the public about these cases and the implications.

 

WHO risk assessment

Since 2004, avian influenza A(H5) viruses have spread from Asia to Europe via wild birds. The genetic clade 2.3.4.4 H5 viruses have often reassorted among other avian influenza viruses, resulting in avian influenza A(H5N1), A(H5N2), A(H5N3), A(H5N5), A(H5N6) and A(H5N8) viruses, some of which have been detected in birds in many countries .

In the Russian Federation, avian influenza A(H5N8) of clade 2.3.4.4 was isolated for the first time in 2014 in a wild bird in the northern region of Russian Far East.

As mentioned earlier, all the seven cases with PCR-positive results were clinically asymptomatic. All close contacts of these cases were clinically monitored, and no one showed signs of clinical illness. Infections with avian influenza viruses of the same clade (H5 clade 2.3.4.4) have been reported from China since 2014 in people with exposure to infected birds.

The likelihood of human infections with influenza A(H5N8) viruses has been considered to be low.

Further genetic and antigenic characterization and information on seroconversion among contacts of the positive cases is required to fully assess the risk.

The development of zoonotic influenza candidate vaccine viruses for potential use in human vaccines, coordinated by WHO, remains an essential component of the overall global strategy for influenza pandemic preparedness.

Based on currently available information, the risk of human-to-human transmission remains low.

 

WHO advice

These cases do not change the current WHO recommendations on public health measures and surveillance of animal and seasonal human influenza, which should continue to be implemented. Respiratory transmission occurs mainly by droplets, disseminated by unprotected coughs and sneezes. Short-distance airborne transmission of influenza viruses may occur, particularly in crowded enclosed spaces. Hand contamination, direct inoculation of virus, exposure to infected birds or virus-contaminated materials or environments are potential sources of infection.

When avian influenza viruses are circulating in an area, the people involved in specific, high-risk tasks such as sampling sick birds, culling and disposing of infected birds, eggs, litter and cleaning of contaminated premises should be trained on how to protect themselves, and on proper use of personal protective equipment (PPE) . People involved in these tasks should be registered and monitored closely by local health authorities for seven days following the last day of contact with poultry or their environments.

Due to the constantly evolving nature of influenza viruses, WHO continues to stress the importance of global surveillance to detect virological, epidemiological and clinical changes associated with circulating influenza viruses that may affect human (or animal) health and timely virus sharing for risk assessment.

Thorough investigation of all potential novel influenza human infections is warranted. All human infections caused by a novel influenza subtype are notifiable under the International Health Regulations (IHR), and State Parties to the IHR are required to immediately notify WHO of any laboratory-confirmed case of a recent human infection caused by new influenza A subtype with the potential to cause a pandemic (please see case definitions for diseases requiring notification under the IHR ). Evidence of illness is not required.

In the case of a confirmed or suspected human infection, a thorough epidemiologic investigation of history of exposure to animals, of travel, and contact tracing should be conducted, even while awaiting the confirmatory laboratory results. The epidemiologic investigation should include early identification of unusual respiratory events that could signal person-to-person transmission of the novel virus. Clinical samples collected from the time and place that the case occurred should be tested and sent to a WHO Collaboration Center for further characterization.

Travelers to countries with known outbreaks of avian influenza should avoid farms, contact with animals in live animal markets, entering areas where animals may be slaughtered, or contact with any surfaces that appear to be contaminated with animal feces. Travelers should also wash their hands often with soap and water. Travelers should follow good food safety and good food hygiene practices.

Based on the currently available information, WHO advises against any special traveler screening at points of entry or restrictions on travel and/or trade with the Russian Federation.

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Keywords: Avian Influenza; H5N8; Human; Russia; WHO; Update.

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[Note from the Blog Author: The cases reported by the WHO were poultry workers and local media, on behalf the regional health authorities, noted that: 

”(…) At the same time, seven employees of the factory complained of slight indisposition, they had a sore throat. All patients underwent outpatient treatment, it is noted that now nothing threatens their health”

(Source: Argumenti i Fakti, in Russian, accessed on February 26 2021, https://aif.ru/health/zarazivshiesya_ptichim_grippom_rabotniki_astrahanskoy_fabriki_proshli_lechenie).

It would be useful to clarify the mismatch between the WHO update and the local media for a better understanding of the current situation of the individuals involved and for a correct risk assessment.]

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#Human #Infection with Eurasian #Avian-Like #Swine #Influenza A(#H1N1) Virus, the #Netherlands, September 2019 (Emerg Infect Dis., abstract)

[Source: US Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), Emerging Infectious Diseases Journal, full page: (LINK). Abstract, edited.]

Volume 27, Number 3—March 2021 | Dispatch

Human Infection with Eurasian Avian-Like Swine Influenza A(H1N1) Virus, the Netherlands, September 2019

Anna Parys, Elien Vandoorn, Jacqueline King, Annika Graaf, Anne Pohlmann, Martin Beer, Timm Harder, and Kristien Van Reeth

Author affiliations: Ghent University, Merelbeke, Belgium (A. Parys, E. Vandoorn, K. Van Reeth); Friedrich-Loeffler-Institut, Greifswald Insel-Riems, Germany (J. King, A. Graaf, A. Pohlmann, M. Beer, T. Harder)

Abstract

We report a zoonotic infection of a pig farmer in the Netherlands with a Eurasian avian-like swine influenza A(H1N1) virus that was also detected in the farmed pigs. Both viruses were antigenically and genetically characterized. Continued surveillance of swine influenza A viruses is needed because of human infection risk.

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Keywords: Avian Influenza; Swine Influenza; Reassortant strain; H1N1; Human; Pigs; Netherlands.

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#Transmission of #SARS-CoV-2 on #mink #farms between #humans and mink and back to humans (Science, abstract)

[Source: Science, full page: (LINK). Abstract, edited.]

Transmission of SARS-CoV-2 on mink farms between humans and mink and back to humans

Bas B. Oude Munnink1,*, Reina S. Sikkema1, David F. Nieuwenhuijse1, Robert Jan Molenaar2, Emmanuelle Munger1, Richard Molenkamp1, Arco van der Spek3, Paulien Tolsma4, Ariene Rietveld5, Miranda Brouwer5, Noortje Bouwmeester-Vincken6, Frank Harders7, Renate Hakze-van der Honing7, Marjolein C. A. Wegdam-Blans8, Ruth J. Bouwstra2, Corine GeurtsvanKessel1, Annemiek A. van der Eijk1, Francisca C. Velkers9, Lidwien A. M. Smit10, Arjan Stegeman9, Wim H. M. van der Poel7, Marion P. G. Koopmans1

1 Department of Viroscience, Erasmus MC, WHO Collaborating Centre for Arbovirus and Viral Hemorrhagic Fever Reference and Research, Rotterdam, Netherlands. 2 Royal GD, Deventer, Netherlands. 3 Netherlands Food and Consumer Product Safety Authority (NVWA), Utrecht, Netherlands. 4 Municipal Health Services GGD Brabant-Zuidoost, Eindhoven, Netherlands. 5 Municipal Health Services GGD Hart voor Brabant, ‘s-Hertogenbosch, Netherlands. 6 Municipal Health Services GGD Limburg-Noord, Venlo, Netherlands. 7 Wageningen Bioveterinary Research, Lelystad, Netherlands. 8 Stichting PAMM, Veldhoven, Netherlands. 9 Division of Farm Animal Health, Department of Population Health Sciences, Utrecht University, Utrecht, Netherlands. 10 Institute for Risk Assessment Sciences (IRAS), Utrecht University, Utrecht, Netherlands.

*Corresponding author: Email: b.oudemunnink@erasmusmc.nl

Science  08 Jan 2021: Vol. 371, Issue 6525, pp. 172-177 | DOI: 10.1126/science.abe5901

Two-way transmission on mink farms

Severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) is a zoonotic virus—one that spilled over from another species to infect and transmit among humans. We know that humans can infect other animals with SARS-CoV-2, such as domestic cats and even tigers in zoos. Oude Munnink et al. used whole-genome sequencing to show that SARS-CoV-2 infections were rife among mink farms in the southeastern Netherlands, all of which are destined to be closed by March 2021 (see the Perspective by Zhou and Shi). Toward the end of June 2020, 68% of mink farm workers tested positive for the virus or had antibodies to SARS-CoV-2. These large clusters of infection were initiated by human COVID-19 cases with viruses that bear the D614G mutation. Sequencing has subsequently shown that mink-to-human transmission also occurred. More work must be done to understand whether there is a risk that mustelids may become a reservoir for SARS-CoV-2.

Science, this issue p. 172; see also p. 120

Abstract

Animal experiments have shown that nonhuman primates, cats, ferrets, hamsters, rabbits, and bats can be infected by severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2). In addition, SARS-CoV-2 RNA has been detected in felids, mink, and dogs in the field. Here, we describe an in-depth investigation using whole-genome sequencing of outbreaks on 16 mink farms and the humans living or working on these farms. We conclude that the virus was initially introduced by humans and has since evolved, most likely reflecting widespread circulation among mink in the beginning of the infection period, several weeks before detection. Despite enhanced biosecurity, early warning surveillance, and immediate culling of animals in affected farms, transmission occurred between mink farms in three large transmission clusters with unknown modes of transmission. Of the tested mink farm residents, employees, and/or individuals with whom they had been in contact, 68% had evidence of SARS-CoV-2 infection. Individuals for which whole genomes were available were shown to have been infected with strains with an animal sequence signature, providing evidence of animal-to-human transmission of SARS-CoV-2 within mink farms.

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Keywords: SARS-CoV-2; COVID-19; Minks; Human; Netherlands.

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#Influenza A(#H1N2) #variant virus – #Brazil (#WHO D.O.N., edited)

[Source: World Health Organization (WHO), full page: (LINK). Edited.]

Influenza A(H1N2) variant virus – Brazil

Disease Outbreak News | 4 January 2021

On 15 December 2020, the Brazil Ministry of Health reported the second confirmed human infection with influenza A(H1N2) variant virus [A(H1N2)v] in Brazil in 2020.

The case was a 4 year-old female who lives on a farm which also functions as a swine slaughter in Irati municipality, Paraná state.

On 16 November 2020, the case had illness onset with a fever, cough, coryza, headache and dyspnea, and was provided ambulatory care on the same day at Darcy Vargas Hospital. He was treated with medication for fever and headache and has recovered. No symptomatic contacts were found among the case’s family.

On 18 and 19 November, respiratory samples were collected for testing. The Parana State Laboratory detected an unsubtypeable influenza A virus and the samples were sent to the Oswaldo Cruz Institute (Fiocruz), the National Influenza Centre (NIC) in Rio de Janeiro for complete viral genome sequencing, where influenza A(H1N2)v virus was confirmed on 14 December.

The A(H1N2)v virus is genetically different from other variant viruses previously detected in humans in Brazil in 2015 and in April 2020, based on preliminary genetic analysis conducted by Fiocruz NIC.

The preliminary analysis shows that all genes are most similar to those from currently circulating influenza A(H1N1)pdm09 viruses, except for neuraminidase which is most similar to those from influenza A(H3N2) viruses.

Further characterization of the virus is underway. All influenza type A viruses detected by sentinel surveillance and viruses submitted from non-sentinel sites (hospital and peripheral laboratories) in Brazil are subtyped by properties of hemagglutinin (H) and neuraminidase (N) surface proteins. To date, no other human infections with variant viruses have been reported in Brazil.

This case is the third human infection of influenza A(H1N2)v virus reported in Parana state and in Brazil. The first case was detected in 2015 and the second in April 2020. These two confirmed cases lived in rural areas with pig farming and one case worked in a pig slaughterhouse.

Public health response

Local authorities carried out epidemiological and veterinary investigations to obtain more information about possible exposure, potential suspected cases, clinical features and evolution of the case among other epidemiological, virological and clinical information. While investigations are ongoing, local authorities enhanced laboratory surveillance and subtyping of influenza samples in Irati municipality where the case was reported.

WHO risk assessment

There has been some limited, non-sustained human-to-human transmission of variant influenza viruses, although ongoing community transmission has not been identified. Current evidence suggests that these viruses have not acquired the ability of sustained transmission among humans. The risk assessment will be reviewed if needed should further epidemiological or virological information become available.

Swine influenza viruses circulate in swine populations in many regions of the world. Depending on the geographic location, genetic characteristics of these viruses vary. When an influenza virus that normally circulates in swine (but not people) is detected in a person, it is called a “variant influenza virus”. Most human cases are the result of exposure to swine influenza viruses through contact with infected swine or in some cases, contaminated environments. Further human cases can be expected because these viruses continue to be detected in swine populations around the world.

Influenza viruses which infect swine may be different from human influenza viruses. Thus, influenza vaccines against human influenza viruses are generally not expected to protect people from influenza viruses that normally circulate in pigs. In addition, pigs are susceptible to avian, human and swine influenza viruses; they potentially may be infected with influenza viruses from different species at the same time. If this happens, it is possible for the genes of these viruses to mix and create a new virus. This type of major change in the influenza A viruses is known as antigenic shift. If this new virus causes illness in people and can be transmitted easily from person-to-person, an influenza pandemic can occur.

Due to the constantly evolving nature of influenza viruses, WHO continues to stress the importance of global surveillance to detect virological, epidemiological and clinical changes associated with circulating influenza viruses that may affect human or animal health and timely virus sharing for risk assessment.

All human infections caused by a novel influenza subtype are notifiable under the International Health Regulations [IHR (2005)] and State Parties to the IHR (2005) are required to immediately notify WHO of any laboratory-confirmed case of a recent human infection caused by an influenza A virus with the potential to cause a pandemic. Evidence of illness is not required for this report.

WHO advice

This case does not change the current WHO recommendations on public health measures and surveillance of seasonal influenza.

WHO does not advise special traveler screening at points of entry or restrictions with regard to the current situation of influenza viruses at the human-animal interface.

Travelers to countries with known outbreaks of animal influenza should avoid farms, contact with animals in live animal markets, entering areas where animals may be slaughtered or contact with any surfaces that appear to be contaminated with animal feces. Travelers should also wash their hands often with soap and water. Travelers should follow good food safety and good food hygiene practices. Should infected individuals from affected areas travel internationally, their infection may be detected in another country during travel or after arrival. If this were to occur, further community level spread is considered unlikely as this virus has not acquired the ability to transmit easily among humans.

In case of a confirmed or suspected human infection caused by a novel influenza virus with pandemic potential, including a variant virus, a thorough epidemiologic investigation of history of exposure to animals, of travel, and contact tracing should be conducted, even while awaiting the confirmatory laboratory results. Epidemiologic investigations should include early identification of unusual respiratory events that could signal human-to-human transmission. Clinical samples collected from the time and place that the case occurred should be tested and sent to a WHO Collaboration Center for influenza for further characterization.

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Keywords: Influenza A; Reassortant strain; H1N2; Human; Brazil; WHO; Update.

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Possible #host – #adaptation of #SARS-CoV-2 due to improved #ACE2 receptor binding in #mink (Virus Evol., abstract)

[Source: Virus Evolution, full page: (LINK). Abstract, edited.]

Possible host-adaptation of SARS-CoV-2 due to improved ACE2 receptor binding in mink

Matthijs R A Welkers, Alvin X Han, Chantal B E M Reusken, Dirk Eggink

Virus Evolution, veaa094, https://doi.org/10.1093/ve/veaa094

Published: 07 December 2020

Abstract

SARS-CoV-2 infections on mink farms are increasingly observed in several countries, leading to the massive culling of animals on affected farms. Recent studies showed multiple (anthropo)zoonotic transmission events between humans and mink on these farms. Mink-derived SARS-CoV-2 sequences from The Netherlands and Denmark contain multiple substitutions in the S protein receptor binding domain (RBD). Molecular modeling showed that these substitutions increase the mean binding energy, suggestive of potential adaptation of the SARS-CoV-2 S protein to the mink ACE2 receptor. These substitutions could possibly also impact human ACE2 binding affinity as well as humoral immune responses directed to the RBD region of the SARS-CoV-2 S protein in humans. We wish to highlight these observations to raise awareness and urge for the continued surveillance of mink (and other animal)-related infections.

Issue Section: Reflections

This content is only available as a PDF.

© The Author(s) 2020. Published by Oxford University Press.

This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution Non-Commercial License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/), which permits non-commercial re-use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited. For commercial re-use, please contact journals.permissions@oup.com

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Keywords: SARS-CoV-2; COVID-19; Human; Minks; ACE2; Evolution.

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#SARS-CoV-2 #mink-associated #variant strain – #Denmark (@WHO D.O.N., Dec. 4 ’20)

[Source: World Health Organization (WHO), full page: (LINK). Edited.]

SARS-CoV-2 mink-associated variant strain – Denmark

Disease Outbreak News: Update | 3 December 2020

___

Since June 2020, Danish authorities have reported an extensive spread of SARS-CoV-2, the virus that causes COVID-19, on mink farms in Denmark. On 5 November, the Danish public health authorities reported the detection of a mink-associated SARS-CoV-2 variant with a combination of mutations not previously observed (referred to as “Cluster 5”) in 12 human cases in North Jutland, detected from August to September 2020.

To date, Statens Serum Institut (SSI) in Denmark has identified seven unique mutations in the spike protein of SARS-CoV-2 among variants co-circulating in mink and humans. SSI cultured the “Cluster 5” variant with four amino acid changes in the spike protein, which was identified in mink and isolated from the 12 human cases reported in North Jutland. Preliminary findings suggested that there was a lower capability of antibodies to neutralize the Cluster 5 strain, which requires further investigation.

Following public health measures implemented by Danish authorities, the incidence of COVID-19 in North Jutland decreased from 100 per 100,000 population in the week beginning 16 November (week 47) to 60 per 100,000 population in the week beginning 2 November (week 45). Over the past weeks, Danish authorities have conducted mass testing of 111 447 individuals in North Jutland using reverse transcriptase polymerase chain reaction (RT-PCR) and are planning to conduct genetic sequencing for all positive samples.

In November 2020, 349 cases were reported among people associated with mink farming, an increase from 200 cases in October 2020. Since June 2020, a total of 644 people associated with mink farming have tested positive. Furthermore, there have been at least 338 cases reported among people working with mink pelting, in six factories and two small facilities, which suggests that there is an increased risk of COVID-19 infection in people who are involved in farming, culling and pelting of mink. As of 1 December 2020, a total of 289 mink farms have been affected, which accounts for approximately 20% of all mink farms in Denmark.

From the week beginning 6 June 2020 (week 24) to the week beginning 16 November 2020 (week 47), 10 386 COVID-19 positive samples from unique individuals underwent whole genome sequencing, which accounted for 17.6% of all positive samples in the corresponding time period. Of these sequenced samples, 750 were virus variants associated with infected mink. In addition, at least two new SARS-CoV-2 variants were recently detected in Southern Denmark which were not genetically related to the original Danish mink-associated variant strain.

In North Denmark, the proportion of SARS-CoV-2 mink-associated variant strains among all sequenced samples decreased from 60% and 51% in weeks 41 and 42, respectively, to 26% and 31% in weeks 46 and 47; in Central Denmark, the proportion increased from ~3% in weeks 41 and 42 to over 30% in weeks 46 and 47; in South Denmark, the proportion increased from 0% in weeks 41 and 42 to 11% and 21% in weeks 46 and 47, respectively, while noting that there are differences in sequencing frequency and practices among various regions. In areas with no affected mink farms, human cases infected with the mink-associated variant have occurred sporadically. As of 20 November, no new human cases of the Cluster 5 strain have been detected by genetic sequencing, and authorities assessed that the Cluster 5 variant is no longer circulating in humans.

Mink have previously been reported to be infected with SARS-CoV-2, including in two outbreaks on large mink farms in the Netherlands in April 2020. Additionally, the Netherlands have reported human infections with mink-associated SARS-CoV-2 strains which were not Cluster 5 strains. To date, eight countries, namely Denmark, Lithuania, Netherlands, Spain, Sweden, Italy, and Greece and the United States of America have reported COVID-19 in farmed mink to the World Organisation for Animal Health (OIE).

Public health response

On 4 November 2020, Denmark decided to cull all farmed mink in Denmark. This decision was made following information that it had not been possible to prevent the spread of infection from farm to farm, or from animals to humans, and mink are acting as a reservoir and contributing to the ongoing transmission in Denmark. On 5 November, movement restrictions were introduced in the affected areas in North Jutland. On 6 November, Denmark shared the full genome sequences of SARS-CoV-2 obtained from humans to the Global Initiative on Sharing Avian Influenza Data (GISAID) platform, and 133 sequences from mink on 18 November. On 19 November 2020, restrictions were lifted in North Jutland due to decreased incidence and the absence of new cases of the Cluster 5 variant identified in the affected areas.

By 25 November, mink on all 289 affected mink farms, and farms within an assigned zone, were culled. Additionally, mink farming has been banned in Denmark until 31 December 2021, including import and export of live mink. Economic support packages have been established for those affected.

Danish authorities have continued to work with the WHO SARS-CoV-2 Virus Evolution Working Group and have agreed to share the Cluster 5 variant SARS-CoV-2 with the COVID-19 Reference Laboratory Network for further studies and testing.

WHO risk assessment

It is expected that all viruses, including SARS-CoV-2 change over time. SARS-CoV-2 strains which are infecting mink and subsequently transmitted back to humans, may have acquired unique mutations to adapt to the mink host. Advanced laboratory studies are required to fully understand the impact of novel variants of SARS-CoV-2 on viral properties such as transmissibility, clinical presentation and effectiveness of diagnostics, therapeutics and vaccines. These studies are long, complex and are done in close collaboration with various research groups.

While public health and social measures implemented by Denmark have led to positive developments, recent findings of other mink-associated variants among human cases in mid-Jutland and the detection of some 200 human cases among workers are of concern.

WHO advice

This event highlights the important role that farmed mink populations can play in the on-going transmission of SARS-CoV-2 and the critical importance of robust surveillance, sampling and sequencing of these viruses by employing a One Health approach, especially around areas where such animal reservoirs are identified. The global relevance of the preliminary findings by Denmark is potentially significant, and WHO recognizes the importance of prompt sharing of epidemiological, virological, and full genome sequence information with other countries and research teams, including through open-source platforms such as GISAID.

WHO advises the following measures:

• Conduct further virological studies to understand the specific mutations described by Denmark and to investigate any changes in transmissibility and pathogenicity of the virus;
• Countries, particularly those with mink and other fur farming, to increase the sequencing of SARS-CoV-2 from human and animal samples where possible and share sequence data, including if the same mutations are found;
• Countries to increase surveillance for COVID-19 at the animal-human interface where susceptible animal reservoirs are identified, including on mink and other fur farms;
• Countries to strengthen farming biosafety and biosecurity measures around known animal reservoirs, particularly on mink farms, to limit the risk of zoonotic events associated with SARS-CoV-2. This includes infection prevention and control measures for animal workers, farm visitors and those involved in animal husbandry or culling;
• Remind communities and health workers of the basic principles to reduce the risk of transmission of acute respiratory infections by:
• Avoiding close contact with people suffering from acute respiratory infections;
• Washing hands frequently, especially after direct contact with ill people or their environment;
• Avoiding unprotected contact with farm or wild animals;
• Practicing cough etiquette, such as maintaining distance, covering coughs and sneezes with disposable tissues or clothing, and washing hands, if experiencing symptoms of acute respiratory infection;
• Enhancing standard infection prevention and control practices in health care facilities, especially in emergency departments of hospitals.

WHO recommends the health measures listed above for all travelers. In case of symptoms suggestive of acute respiratory illness either during or after travel, travelers are encouraged to seek medical attention and share their travel history with their health care provider. Health authorities should work with travel, transport and tourism sectors to provide travelers with information to reduce the general risk of acute respiratory infections via travel health clinics, travel agencies, conveyance operators and at points of entry.

WHO advises against the application of any travel or trade restrictions for Denmark based on information currently available in relation to this event.

(…)

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Keywords: SARS-CoV-2; COVID-19; Minks; Human; Denmark.

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#Genetic #determinants of #receptor-binding preference and #zoonotic potential of #H9N2 #avian #influenza viruses (J Virol., abstract)

[Source: Journal of Virology, full page: (LINK). Abstract, edited.]

Genetic determinants of receptor-binding preference and zoonotic potential of H9N2 avian influenza viruses

Thomas P. Peacock, Joshua E. Sealy, William T. Harvey, Donald J. Benton, Richard Reeve, Munir Iqbal

DOI: 10.1128/JVI.01651-20

ABSTRACT

Receptor recognition and binding is the first step of viral infection and a key determinant of host specificity. The inability of avian influenza viruses to effectively bind human-like sialylated receptors is a major impediment to their efficient transmission in humans and pandemic capacity. Influenza H9N2 viruses are endemic in poultry across Asia and parts of Africa where they occasionally infect humans and are therefore considered viruses with zoonotic potential. We previously described H9N2 viruses, including several isolated from human zoonotic cases, showing a preference for human-like receptors. Here we take a mutagenesis approach, making viruses with single or multiple substitutions in H9 haemagglutinin and test binding to avian and human receptor analogues using biolayer interferometry. We determine the genetic basis of preferences for alternative avian receptors and for human-like receptors, describing amino acid motifs at positions 190, 226 and 227 that play a major role in determining receptor specificity, and several other residues such as 159, 188, 193, 196, 198 and 225 that play a smaller role. Furthermore, we show changes at residues 135, 137, 147, 157, 158, 184, 188, and 192 can also modulate virus receptor avidity and that substitutions that increased or decreased the net positive charge around the haemagglutinin receptor-binding site show increases and decreases in avidity, respectively. The motifs we identify as increasing preference for the human-receptor will help guide future H9N2 surveillance efforts and facilitate our understanding of the emergence of influenza viruses with increased zoonotic potential.

IMPORTANCE

As of 2020, over 60 infections of humans by H9N2 influenza viruses have been recorded in countries where the virus is endemic. Avian-like cellular receptors are the primary target for these viruses. However, given that human infections have been detected on an almost monthly basis since 2015, there may be a capacity for H9N2 viruses to evolve and gain the ability to target human-like cellular receptors. Here we identify molecular signatures that can cause viruses to bind human-like receptors, and we identify the molecular basis for the distinctive preference for sulphated receptors displayed by the majority of recent H9N2 viruses. This work will help guide future surveillance by providing markers that signify the emergence of viruses with enhanced zoonotic potential as well as improving understanding of the basis of influenza virus receptor-binding.

Copyright © 2020 Peacock et al. This is an open-access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International license.

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Keywords: A/H9N2; Avian Influenza; Poultry; Human; Evolution.

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#SARS-CoV-2 #Transmission between #Mink (Neovison vison) and #Humans, #Denmark (Emerg Infect Dis., abstract)

[Source: US Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), Emerging Infectious Diseases Journal, full page: (LINK). Abstract, edited.]

Volume 27, Number 2—February 2021 | Dispatch

SARS-CoV-2 Transmission between Mink (Neovison vison) and Humans, Denmark

Anne Sofie Hammer, Michelle Lauge Quaade, Thomas Bruun Rasmussen, Jannik Fonager, Morten Rasmussen, Karin Mundbjerg, Louise Lohse, Bertel Strandbygaard, Charlotte Sværke Jørgensen, Alonzo Alfaro-Núñez, Maiken Worsøe Rosenstierne, Anette Boklund, Tariq Halasa, Anders Fomsgaard, Graham J. Belsham, and Anette Bøtner

Author affiliations: University of Copenhagen, Copenhagen, Denmark (A.S. Hammer, M.L. Quaade, K. Mundbjerg, A. Boklund, T. Halasa, G.J. Belsham, A. Bøtner); Statens Serum Institut, Copenhagen (T.B. Rasmussen, J. Fonager, M. Rasmussen, L. Lohse, B. Strandbygaard, C.S. Jørgensen, A. Alfaro-Núñez, M.W. Rosenstierne, A. Fomsgaard, A. Bøtner)

Abstract

Severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 has caused a pandemic in humans. Farmed mink (Neovison vison) are also susceptible. In Denmark, this virus has spread rapidly among farmed mink, resulting in some respiratory disease. Full-length virus genome sequencing revealed novel virus variants in mink. These variants subsequently appeared within the local human community.

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Keywords: SARS-CoV-2; COVID-19; Mink; Human; Denmark.

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#Antibody #Responses to #SARS-CoV-2 #Antigens in #Humans and #Animals (Vaccines (Basel), abstract)

[Source: Vaccines (Basel), full page: (LINK). Abstract, edited.]

Antibody Responses to SARS-CoV-2 Antigens in Humans and Animals

by  Hyunsuh Kim 1, Patrick Seiler 1, Jeremy C. Jones 1, Granger Ridout 2, Kristi P. Camp 3, Thomas P. Fabrizio 1, Trushar Jeevan 1, Lance A. Miller 1 , Robert E. Throm 4, Francesca Ferrara 4 , Richard L. Fredrickson 5, James F. Lowe 6, Leyi Wang 7 , Solomon O. Odemuyiwa 8, Xiu-Feng Wan 8  and Richard J. Webby 1,9,*

1 Department of Infectious Diseases, St. Jude Children’s Research Hospital, Memphis, TN 38105, USA; 2 Hartwell Center for Bioinformatics & Biotechnology, St. Jude Children’s Research Hospital, Memphis, TN 38105, USA; 3 Eastgate Animal Clinic, Memphis, TN 38117, USA; 4 Vector Development & Production, St. Jude Children’s Research Hospital, Memphis, TN 38105, USA; 5 Veterinary Diagnostic Laboratory, College of Veterinary Medicine, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, Urbana, IL 61820, USA; 6 Integrated Food Animal Management Systems, Department of Veterinary Clinical Medicine, College of Veterinary Medicine, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, Urbana, IL 61820, USA; 7 Department of Veterinary Clinical Medicine and the Veterinary Diagnostic Laboratory, College of Veterinary Medicine, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, Urbana, IL 61820, USA; 8 Department of Veterinary Pathobiology, College of Veterinary Medicine, University of Missouri, Columbia, MO 65211, USA; 9 Department of Microbiology, Immunology & Biochemistry, College of Medicine, The University of Tennessee Health Science Center, Memphis, TN 38163, USA

*Author to whom correspondence should be addressed.

Vaccines 2020, 8(4), 684; https://doi.org/10.3390/vaccines8040684 (registering DOI)

Received: 28 October 2020 / Revised: 10 November 2020 / Accepted: 12 November 2020 / Published: 16 November 2020

(This article belongs to the Special Issue Evaluation of Vaccine Immunogenicity)

Abstract

To optimize the public health response to coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19), we must first understand the antibody response to individual proteins on the severe acute respiratory syndrome-related coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) and the antibody’s cross reactivity to other coronaviruses. Using a panel of 37 convalescent COVID-19 human serum samples, we showed that the magnitude and specificity of responses varied across individuals, independent of their reactivity to seasonal human coronaviruses (HCoVs). These data suggest that COVID-19 vaccines will elicit primary humoral immune responses in naïve individuals and variable responses in those previously exposed to SARS-CoV-2. Unlike the limited cross-coronavirus reactivities in humans, serum samples from 96 dogs and 10 cats showed SARS-CoV-2 protein-specific responses focused on non–S1 proteins. The correlation of this response with those to other coronaviruses suggests that the antibodies are cross-reactive and generated to endemic viruses within these hosts, which must be considered in seroepidemiologic studies. We conclude that substantial variation in antibody generation against coronavirus proteins will influence interpretations of serologic data in the clinical and veterinary settings.

Keywords: SARS-CoV-2; COVID-19; respiratory viruses; antibody; vaccine

This is an open access article distributed under the Creative Commons Attribution License which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited

Kim, H.; Seiler, P.; Jones, J.C.; Ridout, G.; Camp, K.P.; Fabrizio, T.P.; Jeevan, T.; Miller, L.A.; Throm, R.E.; Ferrara, F.; Fredrickson, R.L.; Lowe, J.F.; Wang, L.; Odemuyiwa, S.O.; Wan, X.-F.; Webby, R.J. Antibody Responses to SARS-CoV-2 Antigens in Humans and Animals. Vaccines 2020, 8, 684.

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Keywords: SARS-CoV-2; COVID-19; Serology; Vaccines; Human; Dogs; Cats.

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#SARS-CoV-2 #mink-associated #variant strain – #Denmark (WHO, edited)

[Source: World Health Organization (WHO), full page: (LINK). Edited.]

SARS-CoV-2 mink-associated variant strain – Denmark

Disease Outbreak News | 6 November 2020

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Since June 2020, 214 human cases of COVID-19 have been identified in Denmark with SARS-CoV-2 variants associated with farmed minks, including 12 cases with a unique variant, reported on 5 November. All 12 cases were identified in September 2020 in North Jutland, Denmark. The cases ranged in age from 7 to 79 years, and eight had a link to the mink farming industry and four cases were from the local community.

Initial observations suggest that the clinical presentation, severity and transmission among those infected are similar to that of other circulating SARS-CoV-2 viruses.

However, this variant, referred to as the “cluster 5” variant, had a combination of mutations, or changes that have not been previously observed.

The implications of the identified changes in this variant are not yet well understood.

Preliminary findings indicate that this particular mink-associated variant identified in both minks and the 12 human cases has moderately decreased sensitivity to neutralizing antibodies.

Further scientific and laboratory-based studies are required to verify preliminary findings reported and to understand any potential implications of this finding in terms of diagnostics, therapeutics and vaccines in development.

In the meantime, actions are being taken by Danish authorities to limit the further spread of this variant of the virus among mink and human populations.

SARS-CoV-2, the virus which causes COVID-19, was first identified in humans in December 2019. As of 6 November, it has affected more than 48 million people causing over 1.2 million deaths worldwide. Although the virus is believed to be ancestrally linked to bats, the virus origin and intermediate host(s) of SARS-CoV-2 have not yet been identified.

Available evidence suggests that the virus is predominantly transmitted between people through respiratory droplets and close contact, but there are also examples of transmission between humans and animals. Several animals that have been in contact with infected humans, such as minks, dogs, domestic cats, lions and tigers, have tested positive for SARS-CoV-2.

Minks were infected following exposure from infected humans. Minks can act as a reservoir of SARS-CoV-2, passing the virus between them, and pose a risk for virus spill-over from mink to humans. People can then transmit this virus within the human population. Additionally, spill-back (human to mink transmission) can occur. It remains a concern when any animal virus spills in to the human population, or when an animal population could contribute to amplifying and spreading a virus affecting humans. As viruses move between human and animal populations, genetic modifications in the virus can occur. These changes can be identified through whole genome sequencing, and when found, experiments can study the possible implications of these changes on the disease in humans.

To date, six countries, namely Denmark, the Netherlands, Spain, Sweden, Italy and the United States of America have reported SARS-CoV-2 in farmed minks to the World Organisation for Animal Health (OIE).

Public health response

Danish authorities have announced the following planned or ongoing public health actions:

• Culling of all farmed mink (more than 17 million) in Denmark, including its breeding stock;
• Enhancing surveillance of the local population to detect all COVID-19 cases, including through population-wide mass PCR testing for the region of North Jutland;
• Expanding the percentage of sequencing of human and mink SARS-CoV-2 infections in Denmark;
• Rapid sharing of the full genome sequences of the mink-variant SARS-CoV-2; and
• Introducing new movement restrictions and other public health measures to affected areas in North Jutland to reduce further transmission, including movement restrictions between municipalities.

WHO risk assessment

All viruses, including SARS-CoV-2, change over time. SARS-CoV-2 strains infecting minks, which are subsequently transmitted to humans, may have acquired unique combinations of mutations. In order to fully understand the impact of specific mutations, advanced laboratory studies are required. These investigations take time and are done in close collaboration between different research groups.

The recent findings reported by the Danish Public Health Authority (Statens Serum Institut) in Denmark related to the novel variant of SARS-CoV-2 identified in humans need to be confirmed and further evaluated to better understand any potential implications in terms of transmission, clinical presentation, diagnostics, therapeutics and vaccine development.

Furthermore, detailed analyses and scientific studies are needed to better understand the reported mutations. The sharing of full genome sequences of human and animal strains will continue to facilitate detailed analyses by partners. Members of the WHO SARS-CoV-2 Virus Evolution Working Group are working with Danish scientists to better understand the available results and collaborate on further studies. Further scientific and laboratory-based studies will be undertaken to understand the implications of these viruses in terms of available SARS-CoV-2 diagnostics, therapeutics and vaccines in development.

Actions taken by the Danish authorities will limit continued spread of mink-associated variants of SARS-CoV-2 in Denmark, and in particular have been implemented to contain the unique variant reported to WHO. These actions include restricting movement of people, culling animals, widespread testing of people living in affected areas and increased genomic sequencing of SARS-CoV-2 viruses across the country.

WHO advice

This event highlights the important role that farmed mink populations can play in the ongoing transmission of SARS-CoV-2 and the critical role of strong surveillance, sampling and sequencing SARS-CoV-2, especially around areas where such animal reservoirs are identified.

The preliminary findings by Denmark are globally relevant and WHO recognises the importance of sharing epidemiological, virological and full genome sequence information with other countries and research teams, including through open-source platforms.

WHO advises further virological studies should be conducted to understand the specific mutations described by Denmark and to further investigate any epidemiological changes in function of the virus in terms of its transmissibility and the severity of disease it causes. WHO advises all countries to increase the sequencing of SARS-CoV-2 viruses where possible and sharing the sequence data internationally.

WHO advises all countries to enhance surveillance for COVID-19 at the animal-human interface where susceptible animal reservoirs are identified, including mink farms.

WHO also reminds countries to strengthen farming biosafety and biosecurity measures around known animal reservoirs in order to limit the risk of zoonotic events associated with SARS-CoV-2. This includes infection prevention and control measures for animal workers, farm visitors and those who may be involved in animal husbandry or culling.

The basic principles to reduce the general risk of transmission of acute respiratory infections are as follows:

• Avoiding close contact with people suffering from acute respiratory infections;
• Ensuring frequent hand-washing, especially after direct contact with ill people or their environment;
• For people with symptoms of acute respiratory infection, practicing cough etiquette, such as maintain distance, cover coughs and sneezes with disposable tissues or clothing, and wash hands; use of masks where appropriate; and
• Enhancing standard infection prevention and control practices in hospitals in health care facilities, especially in emergency departments.

WHO has issued guidance for Public health considerations while resuming international travel, recommending a thorough risk assessment, taking into account country context, the local epidemiology and transmission patterns, the national health and social measures to control the outbreak, and the capacities of health systems in both departure and destination countries, including at points of entry. In case of symptoms suggestive of acute respiratory illness either during or after travel, the travellers are encouraged to seek medical attention and share their travel history with their health care provider. Health authorities should work with travel, transport and tourism sectors to provide travellers with information to reduce the general risk of acute respiratory infections via travel health clinics, travel agencies, conveyance operators, and at points of entry.

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Keywords: SARS-CoV-2; COVID-19; Minks; Denmark; WHO.

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