#SARS-CoV-2 in fruit #bats, #ferrets, #pigs, and #chickens: an experimental #transmission study (Lancet Microbe, abstract)

[Source: Lancet Microbe, full page: (LINK). Abstract, edited.]

SARS-CoV-2 in fruit bats, ferrets, pigs, and chickens: an experimental transmission study

Kore Schlottau, PhD †, Melanie Rissmann, DVM †, Annika Graaf, DVM †, Jacob Schön, PhD †, Julia Sehl, DVM, Claudia Wylezich, PhD, Dirk Höper, PhD, Prof Thomas C Mettenleiter, PhD, Anne Balkema-Buschmann, DVM †, Prof Timm Harder, DVM †, Christian Grund, DVM †, Donata Hoffmann, DVM †, Angele Breithaupt, DVM †, Prof Martin Beer, DVM

Open Access | Published: July 07, 2020 | DOI: https://doi.org/10.1016/S2666-5247(20)30089-6

 

Summary

Background

In December, 2019, a novel zoonotic severe acute respiratory syndrome-related coronavirus emerged in China. The novel severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) became pandemic within weeks and the number of human infections and severe cases is increasing. We aimed to investigate the susceptibilty of potential animal hosts and the risk of anthropozoonotic spill-over infections.

Methods

We intranasally inoculated nine fruit bats (Rousettus aegyptiacus), ferrets (Mustela putorius), pigs (Sus scrofa domesticus), and 17 chickens (Gallus gallus domesticus) with 105 TCID50 of a SARS-CoV-2 isolate per animal. Direct contact animals (n=3) were included 24 h after inoculation to test viral transmission. Animals were monitored for clinical signs and for virus shedding by nucleic acid extraction from nasal washes and rectal swabs (ferrets), oral swabs and pooled faeces samples (fruit bats), nasal and rectal swabs (pigs), or oropharyngeal and cloacal swabs (chickens) on days 2, 4, 8, 12, 16, and 21 after infection by quantitative RT-PCR (RT-qPCR). On days 4, 8, and 12, two inoculated animals (or three in the case of chickens) of each species were euthanised, and all remaining animals, including the contacts, were euthanised at day 21. All animals were subjected to autopsy and various tissues were collected for virus detection by RT-qPCR, histopathology immunohistochemistry, and in situ hybridisation. Presence of SARS-CoV-2 reactive antibodies was tested by indirect immunofluorescence assay and virus neutralisation test in samples collected before inoculation and at autopsy.

Findings

Pigs and chickens were not susceptible to SARS-CoV-2. All swabs, organ samples, and contact animals were negative for viral RNA, and none of the pigs or chickens seroconverted. Seven (78%) of nine fruit bats had a transient infection, with virus detectable by RT-qPCR, immunohistochemistry, and in situ hybridisation in the nasal cavity, associated with rhinitis. Viral RNA was also identified in the trachea, lung, and lung-associated lymphatic tissue in two animals euthanised at day 4. One of three contact bats became infected. More efficient virus replication but no clinical signs were observed in ferrets, with transmission to all three direct contact animals. Mild rhinitis was associated with viral antigen detection in the respiratory and olfactory epithelium. Prominent viral RNA loads of 0–104 viral genome copies per mL were detected in the upper respiratory tract of fruit bats and ferrets, and both species developed SARS-CoV-2-reactive antibodies reaching neutralising titres of up to 1/1024 after 21 days.

Interpretation

Pigs and chickens could not be infected intranasally by SARS-CoV-2, whereas fruit bats showed characteristics of a reservoir host. Virus replication in ferrets resembled a subclinical human infection with efficient spread. Ferrets might serve as a useful model for further studies—eg, testing vaccines or antivirals.

Funding

German Federal Ministry of Food and Agriculture.

Keywords: SARS-CoV-2; COVID-19; Pigs; Poultry; Bats; Ferrets; Animal models.

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#Epidemiology and #Genotypic #Diversity of #EA #Avian-Like #H1N1 #Swine #Influenza Viruses in #China (Virol Sin., abstract)

[Source: Virologica Sinica, full page: (LINK). Abstract, edited.]

Epidemiology and Genotypic Diversity of Eurasian Avian-Like H1N1 Swine Influenza Viruses in China

Zhaomin Feng, Wenfei Zhu, Lei Yang, Jia Liu, Lijuan Zhou, Dayan Wang & Yuelong Shu

Virologica Sinica (2020)

 

Abstract

Eurasian avian-like H1N1 (EA H1N1) swine influenza virus (SIV) outside European countries was first detected in Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (Hong Kong, SAR) of China in 2001. Afterwards, EA H1N1 SIVs have become predominant in pig population in this country. However, the epidemiology and genotypic diversity of EA H1N1 SIVs in China are still unknown. Here, we collected the EA H1N1 SIVs sequences from China between 2001 and 2018 and analyzed the epidemic and phylogenic features, and key molecular markers of these EA H1N1 SIVs. Our results showed that EA H1N1 SIVs distributed in nineteen provinces/municipalities of China. After a long-time evolution and transmission, EA H1N1 SIVs were continuously reassorted with other co-circulated influenza viruses, including 2009 pandemic H1N1 (A(H1N1)pdm09), and triple reassortment H1N2 (TR H1N2) influenza viruses, generated 11 genotypes. Genotype 3 and 5, both of which were the reassortments among EA H1N1, A(H1N1)pdm09 and TR H1N2 viruses with different origins of M genes, have become predominant in pig population. Furthermore, key molecular signatures were identified in EA H1N1 SIVs. Our study has drawn a genotypic diversity image of EA H1N1 viruses, and could help to evaluate the potential risk of EA H1N1 for pandemic preparedness and response.

Keywords: Avian Influenza; Swine Influenza; Influenza A; Reassortant strain; Pigs; H1N1; H1N2; H1N1pdm09; China.

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Prevalent #Eurasian #avian-like #H1N1 #swine #influenza virus with #H1N1pdm09 viral #genes facilitating #human infection (Proc Natl Acad Sci USA, abstract)

[Source: Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America, full page: (LINK). Abstract, edited.]

Prevalent Eurasian avian-like H1N1 swine influenza virus with 2009 pandemic viral genes facilitating human infection

Honglei Sun, Yihong Xiao,  Jiyu Liu, Dayan Wang, Fangtao Li, Chenxi Wang, Chong Li, Junda Zhu, Jingwei Song, Haoran Sun,  Zhimin Jiang, Litao Liu, Xin Zhang, Kai Wei, Dongjun Hou, Juan Pu, Yipeng Sun, Qi Tong, Yuhai Bi, Kin-Chow Chang, Sidang Liu,  George F. Gao, and Jinhua Liu

PNAS first published June 29, 2020 https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.1921186117

Contributed by George F. Gao, April 28, 2020 (sent for review December 9, 2019; reviewed by Ian H. Brown and Xiu-Feng Henry Wan)

 

Significance

Pigs are intermediate hosts for the generation of pandemic influenza virus. Thus, systematic surveillance of influenza viruses in pigs is a key measure for prewarning the emergence of the next pandemic influenza. Here, we identified a reassortant EA H1N1 virus possessing pdm/09 and TR-derived internal genes, termed as G4 genotype, which has become predominant in swine populations since 2016. Similar to pdm/09 virus, G4 viruses have all the essential hallmarks of a candidate pandemic virus. Of concern is that swine workers show elevated seroprevalence for G4 virus. Controlling the prevailing G4 EA H1N1 viruses in pigs and close monitoring in human populations, especially the workers in swine industry, should be urgently implemented.

 

Abstract

Pigs are considered as important hosts or “mixing vessels” for the generation of pandemic influenza viruses. Systematic surveillance of influenza viruses in pigs is essential for early warning and preparedness for the next potential pandemic. Here, we report on an influenza virus surveillance of pigs from 2011 to 2018 in China, and identify a recently emerged genotype 4 (G4) reassortant Eurasian avian-like (EA) H1N1 virus, which bears 2009 pandemic (pdm/09) and triple-reassortant (TR)-derived internal genes and has been predominant in swine populations since 2016. Similar to pdm/09 virus, G4 viruses bind to human-type receptors, produce much higher progeny virus in human airway epithelial cells, and show efficient infectivity and aerosol transmission in ferrets. Moreover, low antigenic cross-reactivity of human influenza vaccine strains with G4 reassortant EA H1N1 virus indicates that preexisting population immunity does not provide protection against G4 viruses. Further serological surveillance among occupational exposure population showed that 10.4% (35/338) of swine workers were positive for G4 EA H1N1 virus, especially for participants 18 y to 35 y old, who had 20.5% (9/44) seropositive rates, indicating that the predominant G4 EA H1N1 virus has acquired increased human infectivity. Such infectivity greatly enhances the opportunity for virus adaptation in humans and raises concerns for the possible generation of pandemic viruses.

swine influenza – Eurasian avian-like H1N1 virus – 2009 pandemic H1N1 virus – reassortant – pandemic potential

 

Footnotes

1 H.S., Y.X., and J.L. contributed equally to this work.

2 To whom correspondence may be addressed. Email: gaof@im.ac.cn or ljh@cau.edu.cn.

Author contributions: Honglei Sun, Y.X., S.L., G.F.G., and Jinhua Liu designed research; Honglei Sun, Y.X., Jiyu Liu, F.L., C.L., J.Z., J.S., Haoran Sun, Z.J., L.L., X.Z., K.W., D.H., and Q.T. performed research; Honglei Sun, Jiyu Liu, D.W., C.W., J.P., Y.B., and Jinhua Liu analyzed data; and Honglei Sun, J.P., Y.S., K.-C.C., G.F.G., and Jinhua Liu wrote the paper.

Reviewers: I.H.B., Animal and Plant Health Agency; and X.-F.H.W., University of Missouri.

The authors declare no competing interest.

Data deposition: The sequences generated in this study have been deposited in the GenBank database (accession nos. are listed in SI Appendix, Table S3).

This article contains supporting information online at https://www.pnas.org/lookup/suppl/doi:10.1073/pnas.1921186117/-/DCSupplemental.

Published under the PNAS license.

Keywords: Influenza A; Reassortant strain; Avian Influenza; Swine Influenza; Pigs; Human; China; H1N1; H1N1pdm09.

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Comparative #pathogenesis of #bovine and #porcine #respiratory #coronaviruses in the #animal #host species and #SARS-CoV-2 in #humans (J Clin Microbiol., abstract)

[Source: Journal of Clinical Microbiology, full page: (LINK). Abstract, edited.]

Comparative pathogenesis of bovine and porcine respiratory coronaviruses in the animal host species and SARS-CoV-2 in humans

Linda J. Saif, Kwonil Jung

DOI: 10.1128/JCM.01355-20

 

ABSTRACT

Discovery of bats with severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS)-related coronaviruses (CoVs) raised the spector of potential future outbreaks of zoonotic SARS-CoV-like disease in humans, which largely went unheeded. Nevertheless, the novel SARS-CoV-2 of bat ancestoral origin emerged to infect humans in Wuhan, China in late 2019 and then became a global pandemic. Less than 5 months after its emergence, millions of people worldwide have been infected asymptomatically or symptomatically and at least 360,000 have died. Coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) in severely affected patients includes atypical pneumonia characterized by a dry cough, persistent fever, and progressive dyspnea and hypoxia, sometimes accompanied by diarrhea and often followed by multiple organ failure, especially, the respiratory and cardiovascular systems. In this mini-review, we focus on two endemic respiratory CoV infections of livestock: Bovine coronavirus (BCoV) and porcine respiratory coronavirus (PRCV). Both animal respiratory CoVs share some common features with SARS-CoV and SARS-CoV-2. BCoV has a broad host range including wild ruminants and a zoonotic potential. BCoV also has a dual tropism for the respiratory and gastrointestinal tracts. These aspects, their interspecies transmission and certain factors that impact disease severity in cattle parallel related facets of SARS-CoV or SARS-CoV-2 in humans. PRCV has a tissue tropism for the upper and lower respiratory tracts and a cellular tropism for type 1 and 2 pneumocytes in lung, but is generally a mild infection unless complicated by other exacerbating factors, such as bacterial or viral co-infections and immunosuppression (corticosteroids).

Copyright © 2020 American Society for Microbiology. All Rights Reserved.

This article is made available via the PMC Open Access Subset for unrestricted noncommercial re-use and secondary analysis in any form or by any means with acknowledgement of the original source. These permissions are granted for the duration of the World Health Organization (WHO) declaration of COVID-19 as a global pandemic.

Keywords: SARS-CoV-2; COVID-19; Coronavirus; Cattle; Pigs.

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#Aerosol #transmission from infected #swine to #ferrets of an #H3N2 virus collected from an #agricultural #fair and associated with #human variant infections (J Virol., abstract)

[Source: Journal of Virology, full page: (LINK). Abstract, edited.]

Aerosol transmission from infected swine to ferrets of an H3N2 virus collected from an agricultural fair and associated with human variant infections

Bryan S. Kaplan, J. Brian Kimble, Jennifer Chang, Tavis K. Anderson, Phillip C. Gauger, Alicia Janas-Martindale, Mary Lea Killian, Andrew S. Bowman, Amy L. Vincent

DOI: 10.1128/JVI.01009-20

 

ABSTRACT

Influenza A viruses (IAV) sporadically transmit from swine to humans, typically associated with agricultural fairs in the USA. A human seasonal H3 from the 2010-2011 IAV season was introduced into the US swine population and termed H3.2010.1 to differentiate from the previous swine H3. This H3N2 lineage became widespread in the US commercial swine population, subsequently spilling over into exhibition swine, and caused a majority of H3N2 variant (H3N2v) cases in humans in 2016 and 2017. A cluster of human H3N2v cases were reported at an agricultural fair in Ohio in 2017 where 2010.1 H3N2 IAV was concurrently detected in exhibition swine. Genomic analysis showed the swine and human isolates were nearly identical. Here we evaluated the propensity of a 2010.1 H3N2 IAV (A/swine/Ohio/A01354299/2017; sw/OH/2017) isolated from a pig in the agricultural fair outbreak to replicate in ferrets and transmit from swine to ferret. Sw/OH/2017 displayed robust replication in the ferret respiratory tract, causing slight fever and moderate weight loss. Further, sw/OH/2017 was capable of efficient respiratory droplet transmission from infected pigs to contact ferrets. These findings establish a model for evaluating the propensity of swine IAV to transmit from pig-to-ferret as a measure of risk to the human population. The identification of higher risk swine strains can then be targeted for control measures to limit the dissemination at human-swine interfaces to reduce the risk of zoonotic infections and inform pandemic planning.

 

IMPORTANCE

A recently emerged lineage of human-like H3N2 (H3.2010.1) influenza A virus (IAV) from swine have been frequently detected in commercial and exhibition swine in recent years and were associated with H3N2 variant cases in humans from 2016 and 2017. To demonstrate a model for characterizing the potential for zoonotic transmission associated with swine IAV, we performed an in vivo transmission study between pigs infected with an H3.2010.1 H3N2 and aerosol contact ferrets. The efficient interspecies transmission demonstrated for the H3.2010.1 IAV-S emphasizes the need for further characterization of viruses circulating at the swine-human interface for transmission potential prior to human spillover and the development and implementation of more robust vaccines and control strategies to mitigate human exposure to higher risk swine strains.

This is a work of the U.S. Government and is not subject to copyright protection in the United States. Foreign copyrights may apply.

Keywords: Swine Influenza; Influenza A; H3N2; Reassortant strain; Pigs; Human; USA; Animal models.

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Susceptibility of #ferrets, #cats, #dogs, and other domesticated #animals to #SARS–coronavirus 2 (Science, abstract)

[Source: Science, full page: (LINK). Abstract, edited.]

Susceptibility of ferrets, cats, dogs, and other domesticated animals to SARS–coronavirus 2

Jianzhong Shi1,*, Zhiyuan Wen1,*, Gongxun Zhong1,*, Huanliang Yang1,*, Chong Wang1,*, Baoying Huang2,*, Renqiang Liu1, Xijun He3, Lei Shuai1, Ziruo Sun1, Yubo Zhao1, Peipei Liu2, Libin Liang1, Pengfei Cui1, Jinliang Wang1, Xianfeng Zhang3, Yuntao Guan3, Wenjie Tan2, Guizhen Wu2,†, Hualan Chen1,†, Zhigao Bu1,3,†

Science  29 May 2020: Vol. 368, Issue 6494, pp. 1016-1020 | DOI: 10.1126/science.abb7015

 

Alternative hosts and model animals

The severe acute respiratory syndrome–coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) pandemic may have originated in bats, but how it made its way into humans is unknown. Because of its zoonotic origins, SARS-CoV-2 is unlikely to exclusively infect humans, so it would be valuable to have an animal model for drug and vaccine development. Shi et al. tested ferrets, as well as livestock and companion animals of humans, for their susceptibility to SARS-CoV-2 (see the Perspective by Lakdawala and Menachery). The authors found that SARS-CoV-2 infects the upper respiratory tracts of ferrets but is poorly transmissible between individuals. In cats, the virus replicated in the nose and throat and caused inflammatory pathology deeper in the respiratory tract, and airborne transmission did occur between pairs of cats. Dogs appeared not to support viral replication well and had low susceptibility to the virus, and pigs, chickens, and ducks were not susceptible to SARS-CoV-2.

Science, this issue p. 1016; see also p. 942

 

Abstract

Severe acute respiratory syndrome–coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) causes the infectious disease COVID-19 (coronavirus disease 2019), which was first reported in Wuhan, China, in December 2019. Despite extensive efforts to control the disease, COVID-19 has now spread to more than 100 countries and caused a global pandemic. SARS-CoV-2 is thought to have originated in bats; however, the intermediate animal sources of the virus are unknown. In this study, we investigated the susceptibility of ferrets and animals in close contact with humans to SARS-CoV-2. We found that SARS-CoV-2 replicates poorly in dogs, pigs, chickens, and ducks, but ferrets and cats are permissive to infection. Additionally, cats are susceptible to airborne transmission. Our study provides insights into the animal models for SARS-CoV-2 and animal management for COVID-19 control.

Keywords: SARS-CoV-2; COVID-19; Ferrets; Cats; Dogs; Pigs; Poultry.

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Comparison of #SARS-CoV-2 #spike protein #binding to #ACE2 #receptors from #human, #pets, #farm #animals, and putative intermediate #hosts (J Virol., abstract)

[Source: Journal of Virology, full page: (LINK). Abstract, edited.]

Comparison of SARS-CoV-2 spike protein binding to ACE2 receptors from human, pets, farm animals, and putative intermediate hosts

Xiaofeng Zhai, Jiumeng Sun, Ziqing Yan, Jie Zhang, Jin Zhao, Zongzheng Zhao, Qi Gao, Wan-Ting He, Michael Veit, Shuo Su

DOI: 10.1128/JVI.00831-20

 

ABSTRACT

The emergence of a novel coronavirus, SARS-CoV-2, resulted in a pandemic. Here, we used X-ray structures of human ACE2 bound to the receptor-binding domain (RBD) of the spike protein (S) from SARS-CoV-2 to predict its binding to ACE2 proteins from different animals, including pets, farm animals, and putative intermediate hosts of SARS-CoV-2. Comparing the interaction sites of ACE2 proteins known to serve or not serve as receptor allows to define residues important for binding. From the 20 amino acids in ACE2 that contact S up to seven can be replaced and ACE2 can still function as the SARS-CoV-2 receptor. These variable amino acids are clustered at certain positions, mostly at the periphery of the binding site, while changes of the invariable residues prevent S-binding or infection of the respective animal. Some ACE2 proteins even tolerate the loss or the acquisition of N-glycosylation sites located near the S-interface. Of note, Pigs and dogs, which are not or not effectively infected and have only a few changes in the binding site, exhibit relatively low levels of ACE2 in the respiratory tract. Comparison of the RBD of S of SARS-CoV-2 with viruses from Bat-CoV-RaTG13 and Pangolin-CoV revealed that the latter contains only one substitution, whereas the Bat-CoV-RaTG13 exhibits five. However, ACE2 of pangolin exhibit seven changes relative to human ACE2, a similar number of substitutions is present in ACE2 of bats, raccoon, and civet suggesting that SARS-CoV-2 may not especially adapted to ACE2 of any of its putative intermediate hosts. These analyses provide new insight into the receptor usage and animal source/origin of SARS-CoV-2.

 

IMPORTANCE

SARS-CoV-2 is threatening people worldwide and there are no drugs or vaccines available to mitigate its spread. The origin of the virus is still unclear and whether pets and livestock can be infected and transmit SARS-CoV-2 are important and unknown scientific questions. Effective binding to the host receptor ACE2 is the first prerequisite for infection of cells and determines the host range. Our analysis provides a framework for the prediction of potential hosts of SARS-CoV-2. We found that ACE2 from species known to support SARS-CoV-2 infection tolerate many amino acid changes indicating that the species barrier might be low. An exception are dogs and especially pigs, which, however, revealed relatively low ACE2 expression levels in the respiratory tract. Monitoring of animals is necessary to prevent the generation of a new coronavirus reservoir. Finally, our analysis also showed that SARS-CoV-2 may not be specifically adapted to any of its putative intermediate hosts.

Copyright © 2020 American Society for Microbiology. All Rights Reserved.

Keywords: SARS-CoV-2; COVID-19; Cats; Dogs; Pigs.

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#Genetic characterization of #influenza A viruses in #Japanese #swine during 2015–2019 (J Virol., abstract)

[Source: Journal of Virology, full page: (LINK). Abstract, edited.]

Genetic characterization of influenza A viruses in Japanese swine during 2015–2019

Junki Mine, Yuko Uchida, Nobuhiro Takemae, Takehiko Saito

DOI: 10.1128/JVI.02169-19

 

ABSTRACT

To assess the current status of influenza A viruses of swine (IAVs-S) throughout Japan and to investigate how these viruses persisted and evolve on pig farms, we genetically characterized IAVs-S isolated during 2015–2019. Nasal swab samples collected through active surveillance and lung tissue samples collected for diagnosis yielded 424 IAVs-S—comprising 78 H1N1, 331 H1N2, and 15 H3N2 viruses—from farms in sampled 21 prefectures in Japan. Phylogenetic analyses of surface genes revealed that the 1A.1 classical swine H1 lineage has evolved uniquely since the late 1970s among pig populations in Japan. During 2015–2019, A(H1N1)pdm09 viruses repeatedly become introduced into farms and reassorted with endemic H1N2 and H3N2 IAVs-S. H3N2 IAVs-S isolated during 2015–2019 formed a clade that originated from 1999–2000 human seasonal influenza viruses; this situation differs from previous reports, in which H3N2 IAVs-S derived from human seasonal influenza viruses were transmitted sporadically from humans to swine but then disappeared without becoming established within the pig population. At farms where IAVs-S were frequently isolated for at least 3 years, multiple introductions of IAVs-S with phylogenetically distinct HA genes occurred. In addition, at one farm, IAVs-S derived from a single introduction persisted for at least 3 years and carried no mutations at the deduced antigenic sites of the hemagglutinin protein except only one at the antigenic site (Sa). Our results extend our understanding regarding the status of IAVs-S currently circulating in Japan and how they genetically evolve at the farm level.

 

Importance

Understanding the current status of influenza A viruses of swine (IAVs-S) and their evolution at the farm level is important for controlling these pathogens. Efforts to monitor IAVs-S during 2015–2019 yielded H1N1, H1N2, and H3N2 viruses. H1 genes in Japanese swine formed unique clade in the classical swine H1 lineage of 1A.1, and H3 genes originating from 1999–2000 human seasonal influenza viruses appear to have become established among Japanese swine. A(H1N1)pdm09-derived H1 genes became introduced repeatedly and reassorted with endemic IAVs-S, resulting in various combinations of surface and internal genes among pig populations in Japan. At the farm level, multiple introductions of IAVs-S with phylogenetically distinct HA sequences occurred, or IAVs-S derived from a single introduction have persisted for at least 3 years with only a single mutation at the antigenic site of the HA protein. Continued monitoring of IAVs-S is necessary to update and maximize control strategies.

Copyright © 2020 Mine et al.

This is an open-access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International license.

Keywords: Influenza A; H1N1pdm09; H1N2; H3N2; Swine Influenza; Reassortant strain; Pigs; Japan.

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#Susceptibility of #ferrets, #cats, #dogs, and other domesticated #animals to #SARS–coronavirus 2 (Science, abstract)

[Source: Science, full page: (LINK). Abstract, edited.]

Susceptibility of ferrets, cats, dogs, and other domesticated animals to SARS–coronavirus 2

Jianzhong Shi1,*, Zhiyuan Wen1,*, Gongxun Zhong1,*, Huanliang Yang1,*, Chong Wang1,*, Baoying Huang2,*, Renqiang Liu1, Xijun He3, Lei Shuai1, Ziruo Sun1, Yubo Zhao1, Peipei Liu2, Libin Liang1, Pengfei Cui1, Jinliang Wang1, Xianfeng Zhang3, Yuntao Guan3, Wenjie Tan2, Guizhen Wu2,†, Hualan Chen1,†, Zhigao Bu1,3,†

1 State Key Laboratory of Veterinary Biotechnology, Harbin Veterinary Research Institute, Chinese Academy of Agricultural Sciences, Harbin 150069, People’s Republic of China. 2 National Institute for Viral Disease Control and Prevention, China CDC, Beijing 102206, People’s Republic of China. 3 National High Containment Laboratory for Animal Diseases Control and Prevention, Harbin 150069, People’s Republic of China.

†Corresponding author. Email: buzhigao@caas.cn (Z.B.); chenhualan@caas.cn (H.C.); wugz@ivdc.chinacdc.cn (G.W.)

* These authors contributed equally to this work.

Science  08 Apr 2020: eabb7015 | DOI: 10.1126/science.abb7015

 

Abstract

Severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) causes the infectious disease COVID-19, which was first reported in Wuhan, China in December, 2019. Despite the tremendous efforts to control the disease, COVID-19 has now spread to over 100 countries and caused a global pandemic. SARS-CoV-2 is thought to have originated in bats; however, the intermediate animal sources of the virus are completely unknown. Here, we investigated the susceptibility of ferrets and animals in close contact with humans to SARS-CoV-2. We found that SARS-CoV-2 replicates poorly in dogs, pigs, chickens, and ducks, but ferrets and cats are permissive to infection. We found experimentally that cats are susceptible to airborne infection. Our study provides important insights into the animal models for SARS-CoV-2 and animal management for COVID-19 control.

Keywords: SARS-CoV-2; COVID-19; Cats; Dogs; Ferrets; Pigs; Poultry.

——

Higher #virulence of #swine #H1N2 #influenza viruses containing #avian-origin #HA and 2009 #pandemic PA and NP in #pigs and mice (Arch Virol., abstract)

[Source: Archives of Virology, full page: (LINK). Abstract, edited.]

Higher virulence of swine H1N2 influenza viruses containing avian-origin HA and 2009 pandemic PA and NP in pigs and mice

Yunyueng Jang, Taehyun Seo & Sang Heui Seo

Archives of Virology (2020)

 

Abstract

Pigs are capable of harbouring influenza A viruses of human and avian origin in their respiratory tracts and thus act as an important intermediary host to generate novel influenza viruses with pandemic potential by genetic reassortment between the two viruses. Here, we show that two distinct H1N2 swine influenza viruses contain avian-like or classical swine-like hemagglutinins with polymerase acidic (PA) and nucleoprotein (NP) genes from 2009 pandemic H1N1 influenza viruses that were found to be circulating in Korean pigs in 2018. Swine H1N2 influenza virus containing an avian-like hemagglutinin gene had enhanced pathogenicity, causing severe interstitial pneumonia in infected pigs and mice. The mortality rate of mice infected with swine H1N2 influenza virus containing an avian-like hemagglutinin gene was higher by 100% when compared to that of mice infected with swine H1N2 influenza virus harbouring classical swine-like hemagglutinin. Further, chemokines attracting inflammatory cells were strongly induced in lung tissues of pigs and mice infected by swine H1N2 influenza virus containing an avian-like hemagglutinin gene. In conclusion, it is necessary for the well-being of humans and pigs to closely monitor swine influenza viruses containing avian-like hemagglutinin with PA and NP genes from 2009 pandemic H1N1 influenza viruses.

Keywords: Influenza A; Avian Influenza; Swine Influenza; H1N1pdm09; H1N2; Reassortant strain; Pigs; Animal models.

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