#Clinical and #virological #data of the first cases of #COVID19 in #Europe: a case series (Lancet Infect Dis., abstract)

[Source: The Lancet Infectious Diseases, full page: (LINK). Abstract, edited.]

Clinical and virological data of the first cases of COVID-19 in Europe: a case series

Prof Francois-Xavier Lescure, MD †, Prof Lila Bouadma, MD †, Duc Nguyen, MD, Marion Parisey, MD, Paul-Henri Wicky, MD, Sylvie Behillil, PharmD, Alexandre Gaymard, PharmD, Maude Bouscambert-Duchamp, PharmD, Flora Donati, MSc, Quentin Le Hingrat, PhD, Vincent Enouf, PhD, Nadhira Houhou-Fidouh, PharmD, Martine Valette, PharmD, Alexandra Mailles, PhD, Prof Jean-Christophe Lucet, MD, Prof France Mentre, PhD, Prof Xavier Duval, MD, Prof Diane Descamps, MD, Prof Denis Malvy, MD, Prof Jean-François Timsit, MD, Prof Bruno Lina, MD †, Prof Sylvie van-der-Werf, PhD †, Prof Yazdan Yazdanpanah, MD  †

Published: March 27, 2020 | DOI: https://doi.org/10.1016/S1473-3099(20)30200-0




On Dec 31, 2019, China reported a cluster of cases of pneumonia in people at Wuhan, Hubei Province. The responsible pathogen is a novel coronavirus, named severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2). We report the relevant features of the first cases in Europe of confirmed infection, named coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19), with the first patient diagnosed with the disease on Jan 24, 2020.


In this case series, we followed five patients admitted to Bichat-Claude Bernard University Hospital (Paris, France) and Pellegrin University Hospital (Bordeaux, France) and diagnosed with COVID-19 by semi-quantitative RT-PCR on nasopharyngeal swabs. We assessed patterns of clinical disease and viral load from different samples (nasopharyngeal and blood, urine, and stool samples), which were obtained once daily for 3 days from hospital admission, and once every 2 or 3 days until patient discharge. All samples were refrigerated and shipped to laboratories in the National Reference Center for Respiratory Viruses (The Institut Pasteur, Paris, and Hospices Civils de Lyon, Lyon, France), where RNA extraction, real-time RT-PCR, and virus isolation and titration procedures were done.


The patients were three men (aged 31 years, 48 years, and 80 years) and two women (aged 30 years and 46 years), all of Chinese origin, who had travelled to France from China around mid-January, 2020. Three different clinical evolutions are described: (1) two paucisymptomatic women diagnosed within a day of exhibiting symptoms, with high nasopharyngeal titres of SARS-CoV-2 within the first 24 h of the illness onset (5·2 and 7·4 log10 copies per 1000 cells, respectively) and viral RNA detection in stools; (2) a two-step disease progression in two young men, with a secondary worsening around 10 days after disease onset despite a decreasing viral load in nasopharyngeal samples; and (3) an 80-year-old man with a rapid evolution towards multiple organ failure and a persistent high viral load in lower and upper respiratory tract with systemic virus dissemination and virus detection in plasma. The 80-year-old patient died on day 14 of illness (Feb 14, 2020); all other patients had recovered and been discharged by Feb 19, 2020.


We illustrated three different clinical and biological types of evolution in five patients infected with SARS-CoV-2 with detailed and comprehensive viral sampling strategy. We believe that these findings will contribute to a better understanding of the natural history of the disease and will contribute to advances in the implementation of more efficient infection control strategies.


REACTing (Research & Action Emerging Infectious Diseases).

Keywords: SARS-CoV-2; COVID-19; France.


The official #French #guidelines to protect patients with #cancer against #SARS-CoV-2 infection (Lancet Oncology, summary)

[Source: The Lancet Oncology, full page: (LINK). Summary, edited.]

The official French guidelines to protect patients with cancer against SARS-CoV-2 infection

Benoit You, Alain Ravaud, Anne Canivet, Gérard Ganem, Philippe Giraud, Rosine Guimbaud, Laure Kaluzinski, Ivan Krakowski, Didier Mayeur, Thomas Grellety, Jean-Pierre Lotz

Published: March 25, 2020 | DOI: https://doi.org/10.1016/S1470-2045(20)30204-7


On request of the French Health Ministry, the French High Council for Public health (Haut Conseil de Santé Publique [HCSP]) entrusted a representative group of French medical oncologists and radiation oncologists, working across academic and private practice, with the task of preparing guidelines to protect patients with cancer against severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) infection, while maintaining the possibility of cancer treatment.


Keywords: SARS-CoV-2; COVID-19; Cancer; France.


First cases of #coronavirus disease 2019 (#COVID19) in #France: #surveillance, #investigations and #control measures, January 2020 (Euro Surveill., abstract)

[Source: Eurosurveillance, full page: (LINK). Abstract, edited.]

First cases of coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) in France: surveillance, investigations and control measures, January 2020

Sibylle Bernard Stoecklin1, Patrick Rolland2, Yassoungo Silue3, Alexandra Mailles1, Christine Campese1, Anne Simondon4, Matthieu Mechain5, Laure Meurice6, Mathieu Nguyen5, Clément Bassi3, Estelle Yamani4, Sylvie Behillil7, Sophie Ismael8, Duc Nguyen9, Denis Malvy9,10, François Xavier Lescure8,11, Scarlett Georges1, Clément Lazarus12, Anouk Tabaï13, Morgane Stempfelet13, Vincent Enouf7, Bruno Coignard1, Daniel Levy-Bruhl1, Investigation team14

Affiliations: 1 Santé publique France, Direction des maladies infectieuses, Saint-Maurice, France; 2 Santé publique France, Direction des régions, Saint-Maurice, France; 3 Santé publique France, Direction des régions, Cellule Régionale Ile-de-France, Paris, France; 4 Agence Régionale de Santé Ile-de-France, Paris, France; 5 Agence Régionale de Santé Nouvelle-Aquitaine, Bordeaux, France; 6 Santé publique France, Direction des régions, Cellule Régionale Nouvelle-Aquitaine, Bordeaux, France; 7 Centre National de Référence des virus des infections respiratoires, dont la grippe, Institut Pasteur, Paris, France; 8 AP-HP, Hôpital Bichat, Service des maladies infectieuses et tropicales, Paris, France; 9 Centre Hospitalier Universitaire de Bordeaux, Bordeaux GeoSentinel Site, Bordeaux, France; 10 UMR 1219, Université de Bordeaux, Bordeaux, France; 11 Université de Paris, IAME, INSERM, Paris, France; 12 Direction Générale de la Santé, Ministère des solidarités et de la santé, Centre opérationnel de réception et de régulation des urgences sanitaires et sociales, Paris, France; 13 Santé publique France, Direction alerte et crise, Saint-Maurice, France; 14 The members of the investigation team are listed at the end of the article

Correspondence:  Sibylle Bernard-Stoecklin

Citation style for this article: Bernard Stoecklin Sibylle, Rolland Patrick, Silue Yassoungo, Mailles Alexandra, Campese Christine, Simondon Anne, Mechain Matthieu, Meurice Laure, Nguyen Mathieu, Bassi Clément, Yamani Estelle, Behillil Sylvie, Ismael Sophie, Nguyen Duc, Malvy Denis, Lescure François Xavier, Georges Scarlett, Lazarus Clément, Tabaï Anouk, Stempfelet Morgane, Enouf Vincent, Coignard Bruno, Levy-Bruhl Daniel, Investigation team. First cases of coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) in France: surveillance, investigations and control measures, January 2020. Euro Surveill. 2020;25(6):pii=2000094. https://doi.org/10.2807/1560-7917.ES.2020.25.6.2000094

Received: 05 Feb 2020;   Accepted: 11 Feb 2020



A novel coronavirus (severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2, SARS-CoV-2) causing a cluster of respiratory infections (coronavirus disease 2019, COVID-19) in Wuhan, China, was identified on 7 January 2020. The epidemic quickly disseminated from Wuhan and as at 12 February 2020, 45,179 cases have been confirmed in 25 countries, including 1,116 deaths. Strengthened surveillance was implemented in France on 10 January 2020 in order to identify imported cases early and prevent secondary transmission. Three categories of risk exposure and follow-up procedure were defined for contacts. Three cases of COVID-19 were confirmed on 24 January, the first cases in Europe. Contact tracing was immediately initiated. Five contacts were evaluated as at low risk of exposure and 18 at moderate/high risk. As at 12 February 2020, two cases have been discharged and the third one remains symptomatic with a persistent cough, and no secondary transmission has been identified. Effective collaboration between all parties involved in the surveillance and response to emerging threats is required to detect imported cases early and to implement adequate control measures.

Keywords: SARS-CoV-2; COVID-19; France.


#Virological and #epidemiological #patterns of #swine #influenza A virus infections in #France: Cumulative data from the RESAVIP surveillance network, 2011-2018

[Source: US National Library of Medicine, full page: (LINK). Abstract, edited.]

Vet Microbiol. 2019 Dec;239:108477. doi: 10.1016/j.vetmic.2019.108477. Epub 2019 Nov 3.

Virological and epidemiological patterns of swine influenza A virus infections in France: Cumulative data from the RESAVIP surveillance network, 2011-2018.

Hervé S1, Garin E2, Calavas D3, Lecarpentier L4, Ngwa-Mbot D5, Poliak S6, Wendling S7, Rose N8, Simon G9.

Author information: 1 ANSES, French Agency for food, environmental and occupational health and safety, Ploufragan-Plouzané-Niort Laboratory, Swine Virology Immunology Unit, National Reference Laboratory for Swine Influenza, Ploufragan, France; Bretagne Loire University, France. Electronic address: severine.herve@anses.fr. 2 Coop de France, Animal Health Service, Paris, France; Epidemiological Surveillance Platform for Animal Health (ESA Platform), Operational Team, Paris, France. 3 Epidemiological Surveillance Platform for Animal Health (ESA Platform), Operational Team, Paris, France; ANSES, French Agency for food, environmental and occupational health and safety, Lyon Laboratory, Epidemiological Surveillance Platform for animal health (ESA Platform), Lyon, France. 4 SNGTV, French National Society of Veterinary Technical Groups, Paris, France. 5 GDS France, French Federation of Health Protection Groups, Paris, France. 6 ADILVA, French Association of Directors and Executives of Public Veterinary Laboratories, Paris, France. 7 Epidemiological Surveillance Platform for Animal Health (ESA Platform), Operational Team, Paris, France; Ministry of Agriculture, DGAL, Directorate General for Food, Paris, France. 8 Bretagne Loire University, France; ANSES, French Agency for food, environmental and occupational health and safety, Ploufragan-Plouzané-Niort Laboratory, Epidemiology, Health and Welfare Unit, Ploufragan, France. 9 ANSES, French Agency for food, environmental and occupational health and safety, Ploufragan-Plouzané-Niort Laboratory, Swine Virology Immunology Unit, National Reference Laboratory for Swine Influenza, Ploufragan, France; Bretagne Loire University, France.



Swine influenza A viruses (swIAVs) cause acute respiratory syndromes in pigs and may also infect humans. Following the 2009 pandemic, a network was established in France to reinforce swIAV monitoring. This study reports virological and epidemiological data accumulated through passive surveillance conducted during 1,825 herd visits from 2011 to 2018. Among them, 887 (48.6 %) tested swIAV-positive. The proportion of positive cases remained stable year-on-year and year-round. The European avian-like swine H1N1 (H1avN1) virus was the most frequently identified (69.6 %), and was widespread across the country. The European human-like reassortant swine H1N2 (H1huN2) virus accounted for 22.1 % and was only identified in the north-western quarter and recently in the far north. The 2009 pandemic H1N1 (H1N1pdm) virus (3.6 %) was detected throughout the country, without settling in areas of higher pig densities. Its proportion increased in winter, during the seasonal epidemics in humans. The European human-like reassortant swine H3N2 as well as H1avN2 viruses were identified sporadically. In up to 30 % of swIAV-positive cases, pigs exhibited clinical signs of high intensity, regardless of the viral subtype and vaccination program. The recurrent pattern of the disease, i.e., an endemic infection at the herd level, was reported in 41% of cases and mainly affected post-weaning piglets (OR = 5.11 [3.36-7.76]). Interestingly, the study also revealed a significant association between the recurrent pattern and sow vaccination (OR = 1.96 [1.37-2.80]). Although restricted to the studied pig population, these results bring new knowledge about swIAV dynamics and infection patterns in pig herds in France.

Copyright © 2019 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

KEYWORDS: Epidemiological features; Pigs; RESAVIP; Surveillance; Swine influenza A virus

PMID: 31767089 DOI: 10.1016/j.vetmic.2019.108477

Keywords: Influenza A; Swine Influenza; H1N1; H1N2; H3N2; H1N1pdm09; Pigs; France; Reassortant strain.


#Mosquitoes of North-Western #Europe as Potential #Vectors of #Arboviruses: A Review (Viruses, abstract)

[Source: US National Library of Medicine, full page: (LINK). Abstract, edited.]

Viruses. 2019 Nov 14;11(11). pii: E1059. doi: 10.3390/v11111059.

Mosquitoes of North-Western Europe as Potential Vectors of Arboviruses: A Review.

Martinet JP1,2, Ferté H1,3, Failloux AB2, Schaffner F4,5, Depaquit J1,3.

Author information: 1 Faculté de Pharmacie, Université de Reims Champagne-Ardenne, ANSES, SFR Cap Santé, EA7510 ESCAPE-USC VECPAR, 51 rue Cognacq-Jay, 51096 Reims CEDEX, France. 2 Arbovirus et Insectes Vecteurs, Département de Virologie, Institut Pasteur, 25-28 rue du docteur Roux, 75015 Paris, France. 3 Laboratoire de Parasitologie, Hôpital Maison-Blanche, CHU de Reims, 45 rue Cognacq-Jay, 51100 Reims, France. 4 National Centre for Vector Entomology, Institute of Parasitology, Vetsuisse Faculty, University of Zurich, Rämistrasse 71, 8006 Zürich, Switzerland. 5 Francis Schaffner Consultancy, Lörracherstrasse 50, 4125 Riehen (Basel-Land), Switzerland.




The intensification of trade and travel is linked to the growing number of imported cases of dengue, chikungunya or Zika viruses into continental Europe and to the expansion of invasive mosquito species such as Aedes albopictus and Aedes japonicus. Local outbreaks have already occurred in several European countries. Very little information exists on the vector competence of native mosquitoes for arboviruses. As such, the vectorial status of the nine mosquito species largely established in North-Western Europe (Aedes cinereus and Aedes geminus, Aedes cantans, Aedes punctor, Aedes rusticus, Anopheles claviger s.s., Anopheles plumbeus, Coquillettidia richiardii, Culex pipiens s.l., and Culiseta annulata) remains mostly unknown.


To review the vector competence of both invasive and native mosquito populations found in North-Western Europe (i.e., France, Belgium, Germany, United Kingdom, Ireland, The Netherlands, Luxembourg and Switzerland) for dengue, chikungunya, Zika, West Nile and Usutu viruses.


A bibliographical search with research strings addressing mosquito vector competence for considered countries was performed.


Out of 6357 results, 119 references were related to the vector competence of mosquitoes in Western Europe. Eight species appear to be competent for at least one virus.


Aedes albopictus is responsible for the current outbreaks. The spread of Aedes albopictus and Aedes japonicus increases the risk of the autochthonous transmission of these viruses. Although native species could contribute to their transmission, more studies are still needed to assess that risk.

KEYWORDS: Aedes; Anopheles; Culex; Culiseta; Usutu; West Nile; Zika; chikungunya; dengue; transmission

PMID: 31739553 DOI: 10.3390/v11111059

Keywords: Zika Virus; Mosquitoes; Aedes albopictus; France.


The first local cases of #Zika virus in #Europe (Lancet, summary)

[Source: The Lancet, full page: (LINK). Summary, edited.]

The first local cases of Zika virus in Europe

Oliver J Brady, Simon I Hay

Published: November 18, 2019 / DOI: https://doi.org/10.1016/S0140-6736(19)32790-4


In October, 2019, the first mosquito-transmitted, locally acquired cases of Zika virus were reported in Europe.1 This outbreak event has implications far beyond the three people affected and represents a new phase in the global Zika threat. When Zika virus first emerged in the Pacific in 2007, then spread to the Americas and the Caribbean in 2015–17, the global community treated Zika virus as an epidemic disease. The Zika virus was expected to spread to Asia,2 but when surveillance began, not only were outbreaks in Asia found to be due to indigenous strains of Zika virus, but the virus was found to have been circulating silently for decades.3



OJB reports grants from Wellcome and SIH declares no competing interests.

Keywords: Zika Virus; France.


#Vector-borne #transmission of #Zika virus in #Europe, southern #France, August 2019 (Euro Surveill., abstract)

[Source: Eurosurveillance, full page: (LINK). Abstract, edited.]

Vector-borne transmission of Zika virus in Europe, southern France, August 2019

Sandra Giron1, Florian Franke1, Anne Decoppet2, Bernard Cadiou3, Thierry Travaglini3, Laurence Thirion4, Guillaume Durand4,5, Charles Jeannin3, Grégory L’Ambert3, Gilda Grard4,5, Harold Noël6, Nelly Fournet6, Michelle Auzet-Caillaud2, Christine Zandotti5, Samer Aboukaïs2, Pascal Chaud1, Saby Guedj7, Lakri Hamouda7, Xavier Naudot8, Anne Ovize8, Clément Lazarus9, Henriette de Valk6, Marie-Claire Paty6, Isabelle Leparc-Goffart4,5

Affiliations: 1 Santé publique France (French National Public Health Agency), Marseille, France; 2 Regional Health Agency of Provence-Alpes-Côtes d’Azur (ARS Paca), Marseille, France; 3 Entente interdépartementale pour la démoustication du littoral méditerranéen (EID Méditerranée), Montpellier, France; 4 Unité des Virus Emergents (UVE: Aix-Marseille Univ – IRD 190 – Inserm 1207 – IHU Méditerranée Infection), Marseille, France; 5 Institut de Recherche Biomédicale des Armées, National Reference Laboratory for Arboviruses, Marseille, France; 6 Santé publique France (French National Public Health Agency), Saint-Maurice, France; 7 Médecin généraliste, Hyères, France; 8 Eurofins Biomnis, Lyon, France; 9 Public Health Emergency Operations Centre, Division of Surveillance and Health Security, Ministry of Health, General Directorate for Health, Health Emergencies Crisis Management Centre, Paris, France

Correspondence:  Harold Noel

Citation style for this article: Giron Sandra, Franke Florian, Decoppet Anne, Cadiou Bernard, Travaglini Thierry, Thirion Laurence, Durand Guillaume, Jeannin Charles, L’Ambert Grégory, Grard Gilda, Noël Harold, Fournet Nelly, Auzet-Caillaud Michelle, Zandotti Christine, Aboukaïs Samer, Chaud Pascal, Guedj Saby, Hamouda Lakri, Naudot Xavier, Ovize Anne, Lazarus Clément, de Valk Henriette, Paty Marie-Claire, Leparc-Goffart Isabelle. Vector-borne transmission of Zika virus in Europe, southern France, August 2019. Euro Surveill. 2019;24(45):pii=1900655. https://doi.org/10.2807/1560-7917.ES.2019.24.45.1900655

Received: 29 Oct 2019;   Accepted: 07 Nov 2019



On 1 October 2019, a locally-acquired Zika virus disease case was laboratory confirmed in Hyères, Var department. Active case finding identified two additional locally-acquired cases living within 90 m, with symptom onset 8 days before the index case. Extensive patient interviews did not yield information supporting transmission through sexual contact or substances of human origin. Vector-borne transmission by local Aedes albopictus mosquitoes is the most likely mode of transmission. Here we describe the public health response.

©  This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License.

Keywords: Zika Virus; France.