#Genetic Characterization of #MERS #Coronavirus, South #Korea, 2018 (Emerg Infect Dis., abstract)

[Source: US Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), Emerging Infectious Diseases Journal, full page: (LINK). Abstract, edited.]

Volume 25, Number 5—May 2019 / Dispatch

Genetic Characterization of Middle East Respiratory Syndrome Coronavirus, South Korea, 2018

Yoon-Seok Chung, Jeong Min Kim, Heui Man Kim, Kye Ryeong Park, Anna Lee, Nam-Joo Lee, Mi-Seon Kim, Jun Sub Kim, Chi-Kyeong Kim, Jae In Lee, and Chun Kang

Author affiliations: Korea Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Cheongju, South Korea (Y.-S. Chung, J.M. Kim, H.M. Kim, K.R. Park, A. Lee, N.-J. Lee, M.-S. Kim, J.S. Kim, C.-K. Kim, C. Kang); Seoul Institute of Public Health and Environment, Seoul, South Korea (J.I. Lee)

 

Abstract

We evaluated genetic variation in Middle East respiratory syndrome coronavirus (MERS-CoV) imported to South Korea in 2018 using specimens from a patient and isolates from infected Caco-2 cells. The MERS-CoV strain in this study was genetically similar to a strain isolated in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, in 2017.

Keywords: MERS-CoV; Saudi Arabia; South Korea.

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A case-crossover #analysis of the #impact of #weather on #primary cases of #MERS (BMC Infect Dis., abstract)

[Source: US National Library of Medicine, full page: (LINK). Abstract, edited.]

BMC Infect Dis. 2019 Feb 4;19(1):113. doi: 10.1186/s12879-019-3729-5.

A case-crossover analysis of the impact of weather on primary cases of Middle East respiratory syndrome.

Gardner EG1, Kelton D1, Poljak Z1, Van Kerkhove M2, von Dobschuetz S3, Greer AL4.

Author information: 1 Ontario Veterinary College, University of Guelph, 50 Stone Road E, Guelph, ON, N1G 2W1, Canada. 2 World Health Organization, Geneva, Switzerland. 3 Animal Health Service – FAO, Viale delle Terme di Caracalla, Rome, Italy. 4 Ontario Veterinary College, University of Guelph, 50 Stone Road E, Guelph, ON, N1G 2W1, Canada. agreer@uoguelph.ca.

 

Abstract

BACKGROUND:

Middle East respiratory syndrome coronavirus (MERS-CoV) is endemic in dromedary camels in the Arabian Peninsula, and zoonotic transmission to people is a sporadic event. In the absence of epidemiological data on the reservoir species, patterns of zoonotic transmission have largely been approximated from primary human cases. This study aimed to identify meteorological factors that may increase the risk of primary MERS infections in humans.

METHODS:

A case-crossover design was used to identify associations between primary MERS cases and preceding weather conditions within the 2-week incubation period in Saudi Arabia using univariable conditional logistic regression. Cases with symptom onset between January 2015 – December 2017 were obtained from a publicly available line list of human MERS cases maintained by the World Health Organization. The complete case dataset (N = 1191) was reduced to approximate the cases most likely to represent spillover transmission from camels (N = 446). Data from meteorological stations closest to the largest city in each province were used to calculate the daily mean, minimum, and maximum temperature (οC), relative humidity (%), wind speed (m/s), and visibility (m). Weather variables were categorized according to strata; temperature and humidity into tertiles, and visibility and wind speed into halves.

RESULTS:

Lowest temperature (Odds Ratio = 1.27; 95% Confidence Interval = 1.04-1.56) and humidity (OR = 1.35; 95% CI = 1.10-1.65) were associated with increased cases 8-10 days later. High visibility was associated with an increased number of cases 7 days later (OR = 1.26; 95% CI = 1.01-1.57), while wind speed also showed statistically significant associations with cases 5-6 days later.

CONCLUSIONS:

Results suggest that primary MERS human cases in Saudi Arabia are more likely to occur when conditions are relatively cold and dry. This is similar to seasonal patterns that have been described for other respiratory diseases in temperate climates. It was hypothesized that low visibility would be positively associated with primary cases of MERS, however the opposite relationship was seen. This may reflect behavioural changes in different weather conditions. This analysis provides key initial evidence of an environmental component contributing to the development of primary MERS-CoV infections.

KEYWORDS: Case-crossover; MERS-CoV; Middle East respiratory syndrome; Veterinary public health

PMID: 30717685 DOI: 10.1186/s12879-019-3729-5

Keywords: MERS-CoV; Human.

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#Survey on Implementation of #OneHealth Approach for #MERS-CoV #Preparedness and #Control in Gulf Cooperation Council and Middle East Countries (Emerg Infect Dis., abstract)

[Source: US Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), Emerging Infectious Diseases Journal, full page: (LINK). Abstract, edited.]

Volume 25, Number 3—March 2019 / Online Report

Survey on Implementation of One Health Approach for MERS-CoV Preparedness and Control in Gulf Cooperation Council and Middle East Countries

Elmoubasher Abu Baker Farag1, Mohamed Nour1, Ahmed El Idrissi1, Jaouad Berrada1, Aya Moustafa, Minahil Mehmood, Mahmoud H. Mahmoud, Ahmed M. El-Sayed, Farhoud Alhajri, Mohammed Al-Hajri, Osama Ahmed Hassan, Hamad Al-Romaihi, Mohamed Al-Thani, Salih A. Al-Marri, Marion P.G. Koopmans, and Mohamed Haroun Ismail

Author affiliations: Ministry of Public Health, Doha, Qatar (E. Abu Baker Farag, M. Nour, A. Moustafa, M. Mehmood, M.H. Mahmoud, A.M. El-Sayed, M. Al-Hajri, H. Al-Romaihi, M. Al-Thani, S.A. Al-Marri); Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, Rome, Italy (A. El Idrissi); Institut Agronomique et Vétérinaire Hassan, Rabat, Morocco (J. Berrada); Ministry of Municipality and Environment, Doha (M.H. Mahmoud, F. Alhajri, M.H. Ismail); Center for Global Health of Oslo University, Oslo, Norway (O.A. Hassan); Erasmus Medical Center, Rotterdam, the Netherlands (M.P.G. Koopmans); University of Nyala, Nyala, Sudan (M.H. Ismail)

 

Abstract

In 2015, a One Health Working Group was established in Qatar to conduct a survey in the Gulf Cooperation Council countries, Egypt, and Jordan to monitor preparedness of public health and veterinary health authorities in response to the Middle East respiratory syndrome coronavirus epidemic. All but 1 country indicated they established joint One Health policy teams for investigation and response. However, the response to the questionnaires was largely limited to veterinary authorities. Critical barriers and limitations were identified. National and regional leaders, policy makers, and stakeholders should be prompted to advocate and enhance adoption of the One Health framework to mitigate the risk for Middle East respiratory syndrome and other emerging zoonotic diseases.

Keywords: MERS-CoV; International Cooperation; Middle East Region.

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#Macrolides in Critically Ill #Patients with #MERS (Int J Infect Dis., abstract)

[Source: US National Library of Medicine, full page: (LINK). Abstract, edited.]

Int J Infect Dis. 2019 Jan 25. pii: S1201-9712(19)30052-9. doi: 10.1016/j.ijid.2019.01.041. [Epub ahead of print]

Macrolides in Critically Ill Patients with Middle East Respiratory Syndrome.

Arabi YM1, Deeb AM2, Al-Hameed F3, Mandourah Y4, Almekhlafi GA5, Sindi AA6, Al-Omari A7, Shalhoub S8, Mady A9, Alraddadi B10, Almotairi A11, Al Khatib K12, Abdulmomen A13, Qushmaq I14, Solaiman O15, Al-Aithan AM16, Al-Raddadi R17, Ragab A18, Al Harthy A19, Kharaba A20, Jose J21, Dabbagh T22, Fowler RA23, Balkhy HH24, Merson L25, Hayden FG26.

Author information: 1 College of Medicine, King Saud Bin Abdulaziz University for Health Sciences, King Abdullah International Medical Research Center, Riyadh, Saudi Arabia; Intensive Care Department, King Abdulaziz Medical City, National Guard – Health Affairs, Riyadh, Saudi Arabia. Electronic address: arabi@ngha.med.sa. 2 King Saud Bin Abdulaziz University for Health Sciences, King Abdullah International Medical Research Center, Research Office, King Abdulaziz Medical City, National Guard – Health Affairs, Riyadh, Saudi Arabia. Electronic address: rn_a_deeb@hotmail.com. 3 College of Medicine, King Saud bin Abdulaziz University for Health Sciences, King Abdullah International Medical Research Center, Jeddah, Saudi Arabia; Department of Intensive Care, King Abdulaziz Medical City, National Guard – Health Affairs, Jeddah, Saudi Arabia. Electronic address: Hameedf@ngha.med.sa. 4 Department of Intensive Care Services, Prince Sultan Military Medical City, Riyadh, Saudi Arabia. Electronic address: Yasser.mandourah@me.com. 5 Department of Intensive Care Services, Prince Sultan Military Medical City, Riyadh, Saudi Arabia. Electronic address: gmekhlafi@yahoo.com. 6 Department of Anesthesia and Critical Care, Faculty of Medicine, King Abdulaziz University, Jeddah, Saudi Arabia. Electronic address: ansindi@gmail.com. 7 College of Medicine, Alfaisal University, Riyadh, Saudi Arabia; Department of Intensive Care, Dr Sulaiman Al-Habib Group Hospitals, Riyadh, Saudi Arabia. Electronic address: dr_awad_ksa@yahoo.com. 8 Division of Infectious Diseases, Department of Medicine, King Fahad Armed Forces Hospital, Jeddah, Saudi Arabia. Electronic address: sarah.shalhoub@googlemail.com. 9 Intensive Care Department, King Saud Medical City, Riyadh, Saudi Arabia; Department of Anesthesiology and Intensive Care, Tanta University Hospitals, Tanta, Egypt. Electronic address: afmady@hotmail.com. 10 College of Medicine, Alfaisal University, Riyadh, Saudi Arabia; Department of Medicine, King Faisal Specialist Hospital and Research Center, Jeddah, Saudi Arabia. Electronic address: basemalraddadi@gmail.com. 11 Department of Critical Care Medicine, King Fahad Medical City, Riyadh, Saudi Arabia. Electronic address: aalmotairi@kfmc.med.sa. 12 Intensive Care Department, Al-Noor Specialist Hospital, Makkah, Saudi Arabia. Electronic address: kasimalkhatib@yahoo.com. 13 Department of Critical Care Medicine, King Saud University, Riyadh, Saudi Arabia. Electronic address: aturk@ksu.edu.sa. 14 Department of Medicine, King Faisal Specialist Hospital and Research Center, Jeddah, Saudi Arabia. Electronic address: iqushmaq@kfshrc.edu.sa. 15 King Faisal Specialist Hospital and Research Center, Riyadh, Saudi Arabia. Electronic address: omsmd@yahoo.com. 16 King Saud Bin Abdulaziz University for Health Sciences, King Abdullah International Medical Research Center, Intensive Care Department, King Abdulaziz Hospital, Al Ahsa, Saudi Arabia. Electronic address: AithanA@ngha.med.sa. 17 King Abdulaziz University, Department of Family and Community Medicine, Jeddah, Saudi Arabia. Electronic address: saudiresearcher@yahoo.com. 18 Intensive Care Department, King Fahd Hospital, Jeddah, Saudi Arabia. Electronic address: ahmadragab63@hotmail.com. 19 Intensive Care Department, King Saud Medical City, Riyadh, Saudi Arabia. Electronic address: a_almshal@hotmail.com. 20 Department of Critical Care, King Fahad Hospital, Ohoud Hospital, Al-Madinah Al-Monawarah, Saudi Arabia. Electronic address: a7yman@hotmail.com. 21 King Saud Bin Abdulaziz University for Health Sciences, King Abdullah International Medical Research Center, Department Biostatistics and Bioinformatics, King Abdulaziz Medical City, National Guard – Health Affairs, Riyadh, Saudi Arabia. Electronic address: joseje@ngha.med.sa. 22 King Saud Bin Abdulaziz University for Health Sciences, King Abdullah International Medical Research Center, Riyadh, Saudi Arabia; Intensive Care Department, King Abdulaziz Medical City, National Guard – Health Affairs, Riyadh, Saudi Arabia. Electronic address: DabbaghT@ngha.med.sa. 23 Institute of Health Policy Management and Evaluation, University of Toronto, Toronto, Ontario, Canada; Department of Critical Care Medicine and Department of Medicine, Sunnybrook Hospital, Toronto, Ontario, Canada. Electronic address: rob.fowler@sunnybrook.ca. 24 College of Medicine, King Saud Bin Abdulaziz University for Health Sciences, King Abdullah International Medical Research Center, Riyadh, Saudi Arabia; Department of Infection Prevention and Control, King Abdulaziz Medical City National Guard – Health Affairs, Riyadh, Saudi Arabia. Electronic address: BalkhyH@ngha.med.sa. 25 International Severe Acute Respiratory and Emerging Infection Consortium (ISARIC), Infectious Diseases Data Observatory, Oxford University, Oxford, United Kingdom. Electronic address: laura.merson@ndm.ox.ac.uk. 26 International Severe Acute Respiratory and Emerging Infection Consortium (ISARIC), Division of Infectious Diseases and International Health, Department of Medicine, University of Virginia School of Medicine, Charlottesville, Virginia. Electronic address: fgh@virginia.edu.

 

Abstract

OBJECTIVES:

Macrolides have been reported to be associated with improved outcomes in patients with viral pneumonia related to influenza and other viruses, possibly because of their immune-modulatory effects. Macrolides have frequently been used in patients with Middle East Respiratory Syndrome (MERS). This study investigated the association of macrolides with 90-day mortality and MERS coronavirus (CoV) RNA clearance in critically ill patients with MERS.

METHODS:

This retrospective analysis of a multicenter cohort database included 14 tertiary-care hospitals in five cities in Saudi Arabia. Multivariate logistic-regression analysis was used to determine the association of macrolide therapy with 90-day mortality, and the Cox-proportional hazard model to determine the association of macrolide therapy with MERS-CoV RNA clearance.

RESULTS:

Of 349 critically ill MERS patients, 136 (39%) received macrolide therapy. Azithromycin was most commonly used (97/136; 71.3%). Macrolide therapy was commonly started before the patient arrived in the intensive care unit (ICU) (63/136; 46.3%), or on day1 in ICU (53/136; 39%). On admission to ICU, the baseline characteristics of patients who received and did not receive macrolides were similar, including demographic data and sequential organ failure assessment score. However, patients who received macrolides were more likely to be admitted with community-acquired MERS (P=0.015). Macrolide therapy was not independently associated with a significant difference in 90-day mortality (adjusted OR: 0.84; 95% CI:0.47-1.51; P=0.56) or MERS-CoV RNA clearance (adjusted HR: 0.88; 95% CI:0.47-1.64; P=0.68).

CONCLUSIONS:

These findings indicate that macrolide therapy is not associated with a reduction in 90-day mortality or improvement in MERS-CoV RNA clearance.

Copyright © 2019. Published by Elsevier Ltd.

KEYWORDS: Azithromycin; Critical Care; Influenza; MERS-CoV; Macrolides; Pneumonia

PMID: 30690213 DOI: 10.1016/j.ijid.2019.01.041

Keywords: MERS-CoV; Antibiotics; Antivirals; Macrolides; Azithromycin.

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#Prophylactic efficacy of a #human #mAb against #MERS #Coronavirus in the common marmoset (Antiviral Res., abstract)

[Source: US National Library of Medicine, full page: (LINK). Abstract, edited.]

Antiviral Res. 2019 Jan 23. pii: S0166-3542(19)30036-1. doi: 10.1016/j.antiviral.2019.01.016. [Epub ahead of print]

Prophylactic efficacy of a human monoclonal antibody against MERS-CoV in the common marmoset.

de Wit E1, Feldmann F2, Horne E1, Okumura A3, Cameroni E4, Haddock E1, Saturday G2, Scott D2, Gopal R5, Zambon M5, Corti D4, Feldmann H6.

Author information: 1 Laboratory of Virology, Hamilton, MT, USA. 2 Rocky Mountain Veterinary Branch, National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases, National Institutes of Health, Hamilton, MT, USA. 3 Center for Infection and Immunity, Mailman School of Public Health, Columbia University, New York, NY, USA. 4 Humabs BioMed SA, A Subsidiary of Vir Biotechnology, 6500, Bellinzona, Switzerland. 5 National Infection Service, Public Health England (PHE), London, NW9 5EQ, United Kingdom. 6 Laboratory of Virology, Hamilton, MT, USA. Electronic address: feldmannh@niaid.nih.gov.

 

Abstract

Effective antiviral treatments for MERS-CoV are urgently needed. LCA60 is a MERS-CoV-neutralizing monoclonal antibody isolated from a convalescent MERS patient. Previously, it was shown that treatment with LCA60 resulted in reduced disease and virus titers in mouse models of MERS-CoV infection. Here, we tested the prophylactic efficacy of LCA60 in the common marmoset model of MERS-CoV infection. Intravenous administration of LCA60 one day before virus challenge resulted in high levels of MERS-CoV-neutralizing activity in circulating blood. Clinically, there was a moderate benefit of treatment with LCA60 including reduced respiratory involvement. Although viral lung loads were not reduced in LCA60-treated animals as compared to controls, there were fewer pathological changes in the lungs. Thus, prophylactic LCA60 treatment could be implemented to reduce disease burden in contacts of confirmed MERS-CoV patients.

Copyright © 2019. Published by Elsevier B.V.

KEYWORDS: Common marmoset; LCA60; MERS-CoV; Neutralizing monoclonal antibody; Prophylaxis; Treatment

PMID: 30684561 DOI: 10.1016/j.antiviral.2019.01.016

Keywords: MERS-CoV; Monoclonal antibodies; Animal models.

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What Have We Learned About #MERS #Coronavirus Emergence in #Humans? A Systematic Literature #Review (Vector Borne Zoo Dis., abstract)

[Source: Vector Borne and Zoonotic Diseases, full page: (LINK). Abstract, edited.]

What Have We Learned About Middle East Respiratory Syndrome Coronavirus Emergence in Humans? A Systematic Literature Review

Patrick Dawson, Mamunur Rahman Malik, Faruque Parvez, and Stephen S. Morse

Published Online: 24 Jan 2019 / DOI: https://doi.org/10.1089/vbz.2017.2191

 

Abstract

Background:

Middle East respiratory syndrome coronavirus (MERS-CoV) was first identified in humans in 2012. A systematic literature review was conducted to synthesize current knowledge and identify critical knowledge gaps.

Materials and Methods:

We conducted a systematic review on MERS-CoV using PRISMA guidelines. We identified 407 relevant, peer-reviewed publications and selected 208 of these based on their contributions to four key areas: virology; clinical characteristics, outcomes, therapeutic and preventive options; epidemiology and transmission; and animal interface and the search for natural hosts of MERS-CoV.

Results:

Dipeptidyl peptidase 4 (DPP4/CD26) was identified as the human receptor for MERS-CoV, and a variety of molecular and serological assays developed. Dromedary camels remain the only documented zoonotic source of human infection, but MERS-like CoVs have been detected in bat species globally, as well as in dromedary camels throughout the Middle East and Africa. However, despite evidence of camel-to-human MERS-CoV transmission and cases apparently related to camel contact, the source of many primary cases remains unknown. There have been sustained health care-associated human outbreaks in Saudi Arabia and South Korea, the latter originating from one traveler returning from the Middle East. Transmission mechanisms are poorly understood; for health care, this may include environmental contamination. Various potential therapeutics have been identified, but not yet evaluated in human clinical trials. At least one candidate vaccine has progressed to Phase I trials.

Conclusions:

There has been substantial MERS-CoV research since 2012, but significant knowledge gaps persist, especially in epidemiology and natural history of the infection. There have been few rigorous studies of baseline prevalence, transmission, and spectrum of disease. Terms such as “camel exposure” and the epidemiological relationships of cases should be clearly defined and standardized. We strongly recommend a shared and accessible registry or database. Coronaviruses will likely continue to emerge, arguing for a unified “One Health” approach.

Keywords: MERS-CoV; Coronavirus; Human; Camels; Bats; Vaccines.

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From #SARS to #MERS, Thrusting #Coronaviruses into the Spotlight (Viruses, abstract)

[Source: US National Library of Medicine, full page: (LINK). Abstract, edited.]

Viruses. 2019 Jan 14;11(1). pii: E59. doi: 10.3390/v11010059.

From SARS to MERS, Thrusting Coronaviruses into the Spotlight.

Song Z1,2,3, Xu Y4,5,6, Bao L7,8,9, Zhang L10,11,12, Yu P13,14,15, Qu Y16,17,18, Zhu H19,20,21, Zhao W22,23,24, Han Y25,26,27, Qin C28,29,30.

Author information: 1 Institute of Laboratory Animal Science, Chinese Academy of Medical Sciences (CAMS) & Comparative Medicine Centre, Peking Union Medical Collage (PUMC), Beijing 100021, China. songzhiqi1989@foxmail.com. 2 NHC Key Laboratory of Human Disease Comparative Medicine, the Institute of Laboratory Animal Sciences, CAMS&PUMC, Beijing 100021, China. songzhiqi1989@foxmail.com. 3 Beijing Key Laboratory for Animal Models of Emerging and Reemerging Infectious, Beijing 100021, China. songzhiqi1989@foxmail.com. 4 Institute of Laboratory Animal Science, Chinese Academy of Medical Sciences (CAMS) & Comparative Medicine Centre, Peking Union Medical Collage (PUMC), Beijing 100021, China. xuyanf2009@163.com. 5 NHC Key Laboratory of Human Disease Comparative Medicine, the Institute of Laboratory Animal Sciences, CAMS&PUMC, Beijing 100021, China. xuyanf2009@163.com. 6 Beijing Key Laboratory for Animal Models of Emerging and Reemerging Infectious, Beijing 100021, China. xuyanf2009@163.com. 7 Institute of Laboratory Animal Science, Chinese Academy of Medical Sciences (CAMS) & Comparative Medicine Centre, Peking Union Medical Collage (PUMC), Beijing 100021, China. bllmsl@aliyun.com. 8 NHC Key Laboratory of Human Disease Comparative Medicine, the Institute of Laboratory Animal Sciences, CAMS&PUMC, Beijing 100021, China. bllmsl@aliyun.com. 9 Beijing Key Laboratory for Animal Models of Emerging and Reemerging Infectious, Beijing 100021, China. bllmsl@aliyun.com. 10 Institute of Laboratory Animal Science, Chinese Academy of Medical Sciences (CAMS) & Comparative Medicine Centre, Peking Union Medical Collage (PUMC), Beijing 100021, China. zhangling@cnilas.org. 11 NHC Key Laboratory of Human Disease Comparative Medicine, the Institute of Laboratory Animal Sciences, CAMS&PUMC, Beijing 100021, China. zhangling@cnilas.org. 12 Beijing Key Laboratory for Animal Models of Emerging and Reemerging Infectious, Beijing 100021, China. zhangling@cnilas.org. 13 Institute of Laboratory Animal Science, Chinese Academy of Medical Sciences (CAMS) & Comparative Medicine Centre, Peking Union Medical Collage (PUMC), Beijing 100021, China. pinyucau@gmail.com. 14 NHC Key Laboratory of Human Disease Comparative Medicine, the Institute of Laboratory Animal Sciences, CAMS&PUMC, Beijing 100021, China. pinyucau@gmail.com. 15 Beijing Key Laboratory for Animal Models of Emerging and Reemerging Infectious, Beijing 100021, China. pinyucau@gmail.com. 16 Institute of Laboratory Animal Science, Chinese Academy of Medical Sciences (CAMS) & Comparative Medicine Centre, Peking Union Medical Collage (PUMC), Beijing 100021, China. quyj@cnilas.org. 17 NHC Key Laboratory of Human Disease Comparative Medicine, the Institute of Laboratory Animal Sciences, CAMS&PUMC, Beijing 100021, China. quyj@cnilas.org. 18 Beijing Key Laboratory for Animal Models of Emerging and Reemerging Infectious, Beijing 100021, China. quyj@cnilas.org. 19 Institute of Laboratory Animal Science, Chinese Academy of Medical Sciences (CAMS) & Comparative Medicine Centre, Peking Union Medical Collage (PUMC), Beijing 100021, China. zhuh@cnilas.org. 20 NHC Key Laboratory of Human Disease Comparative Medicine, the Institute of Laboratory Animal Sciences, CAMS&PUMC, Beijing 100021, China. zhuh@cnilas.org. 21 Beijing Key Laboratory for Animal Models of Emerging and Reemerging Infectious, Beijing 100021, China. zhuh@cnilas.org. 22 Institute of Laboratory Animal Science, Chinese Academy of Medical Sciences (CAMS) & Comparative Medicine Centre, Peking Union Medical Collage (PUMC), Beijing 100021, China. hnndwenjiezhao@163.com. 23 NHC Key Laboratory of Human Disease Comparative Medicine, the Institute of Laboratory Animal Sciences, CAMS&PUMC, Beijing 100021, China. hnndwenjiezhao@163.com. 24 Beijing Key Laboratory for Animal Models of Emerging and Reemerging Infectious, Beijing 100021, China. hnndwenjiezhao@163.com. 25 Institute of Laboratory Animal Science, Chinese Academy of Medical Sciences (CAMS) & Comparative Medicine Centre, Peking Union Medical Collage (PUMC), Beijing 100021, China. 18510165683@163.com. 26 NHC Key Laboratory of Human Disease Comparative Medicine, the Institute of Laboratory Animal Sciences, CAMS&PUMC, Beijing 100021, China. 18510165683@163.com. 27 Beijing Key Laboratory for Animal Models of Emerging and Reemerging Infectious, Beijing 100021, China. 18510165683@163.com. 28 Institute of Laboratory Animal Science, Chinese Academy of Medical Sciences (CAMS) & Comparative Medicine Centre, Peking Union Medical Collage (PUMC), Beijing 100021, China. qinchuan@pumc.edu.cn. 29 NHC Key Laboratory of Human Disease Comparative Medicine, the Institute of Laboratory Animal Sciences, CAMS&PUMC, Beijing 100021, China. qinchuan@pumc.edu.cn. 30 Beijing Key Laboratory for Animal Models of Emerging and Reemerging Infectious, Beijing 100021, China. qinchuan@pumc.edu.cn.

 

Abstract

Coronaviruses (CoVs) have formerly been regarded as relatively harmless respiratory pathogens to humans. However, two outbreaks of severe respiratory tract infection, caused by the severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus (SARS-CoV) and the Middle East respiratory syndrome coronavirus (MERS-CoV), as a result of zoonotic CoVs crossing the species barrier, caused high pathogenicity and mortality rates in human populations. This brought CoVs global attention and highlighted the importance of controlling infectious pathogens at international borders. In this review, we focus on our current understanding of the epidemiology, pathogenesis, prevention, and treatment of SARS-CoV and MERS-CoV, as well as provides details on the pivotal structure and function of the spike proteins (S proteins) on the surface of each of these viruses. For building up more suitable animal models, we compare the current animal models recapitulating pathogenesis and summarize the potential role of host receptors contributing to diverse host affinity in various species. We outline the research still needed to fully elucidate the pathogenic mechanism of these viruses, to construct reproducible animal models, and ultimately develop countermeasures to conquer not only SARS-CoV and MERS-CoV, but also these emerging coronaviral diseases.

KEYWORDS: MERS-CoV; SARS-CoV; animal model; coronaviruses; prevention and treatment; spike proteins

PMID: 30646565 DOI: 10.3390/v11010059

Keywords: MERS-CoV; SARS; Coronavirus.

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