Emergence of #Influenza A(#H7N4) Virus, #Cambodia (Emerg Infect Dis., abstract)

[Source: US Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), Emerging Infectious Diseases Journal, full page: (LINK). Abstract, edited.]

Volume 25, Number 10—October 2019 / Research Letter

Emergence of Influenza A(H7N4) Virus, Cambodia

Dhanasekaran Vijaykrishna, Yi-Mo Deng, Miguel L. Grau, Matthew Kay, Annika Suttie, Paul F. Horwood, Wantanee Kalpravidh, Filip Claes, Kristina Osbjer, Phillipe Dussart, Ian G. Barr, and Erik A. Karlsson

Author affiliations: Peter Doherty Institute for Infection and Immunity, Melbourne, Victoria, Australia (D. Vijaykrishna, Y.-M. Deng, M. Kay, I.G. Barr); Monash University, Melbourne (D. Vijaykrishna, M.L. Grau); Institut Pasteur du Cambodge, Phnom Penh, Cambodia (A. Suttie, P.F. Horwood, P. Dussart, E.A. Karlsson); James Cook University, Townsville, Queensland, Australia (P.F. Horwood); Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, Bangkok, Thailand (W. Kalpravidh, F. Claes); Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, Phnom Penh, Cambodia (K. Osbjer)

 

Abstract

Active surveillance in high-risk sites in Cambodia has identified multiple low-pathogenicity influenza A(H7) viruses, mainly in ducks. None fall within the A/Anhui/1/2013(H7N9) lineage; however, some A(H7) viruses from 2018 show temporal and phylogenetic similarity to the H7N4 virus that caused a nonfatal infection in Jiangsu Province, China, in December 2017.

Keywords: Avian Influenza; H7N4; Reassortant strain; Cambodia.

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A novel #H7N3 #reassortant originating from the zoonotic #H7N9 highly pathogenic #avian #influenza viruses that has adapted to #ducks (Transbound Emerg Dis., abstract)

[Source: US National Library of Medicine, full page: (LINK). Abstract, edited.]

Transbound Emerg Dis. 2019 Jul 11. doi: 10.1111/tbed.13291. [Epub ahead of print]

A novel H7N3 reassortant originating from the zoonotic H7N9 highly pathogenic avian influenza viruses that has adapted to ducks.

Nakayama M1, Uchida Y1, Shibata A2, Kobayashi Y3, Mine J1, Takemae N1, Tsunekuni R1, Tanikawa T1, Harada R2, Osaka H2, Saito T1,4.

Author information: 1 Division of Transboundary Animal Disease, National Institute of Animal Health, National Agriculture and Food Research Organization (NARO), 3-1-5 Kannondai, Tsukuba, Ibaraki, 305-0856, Japan. 2 Exotic Disease Inspection Division, Laboratory Department, Animal Quarantine Service, Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries, Tokoname, Aichi, 479-0881, Japan. 3 Pathological and Physiochemical Examination Division, Laboratory Department, Animal Quarantine Service, Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries, Yokohama, Kanagawa, 235-0008, Japan. 4 United Graduate School of Veterinary Sciences, Gifu University, 1-1 Yanagido, Gifu, 501-1193, Japan.

 

Abstract

The first human case of zoonotic H7N9 avian influenza virus (AIV) infection was reported in March 2013 in China. This virus continues to circulate in poultry in China while mutating to highly pathogenic AIVs (HPAIVs). Through monitoring at airports in Japan, a novel H7N3 reassortant of the zoonotic H7N9 HPAIVs, A/duck/Japan/AQ-HE30-1/2018 (HE30-1), was detected in a poultry meat product illegally brought by a passenger from China into Japan. We analyzed the genetic, pathogenic, and antigenic characteristics of HE30-1 by comparing it with previous zoonotic H7N9 AIVs and their reassortants. Phylogenetic analysis of the entire HE30-1 genomic sequence revealed that it comprised at least three different sources; the HA (H7), PB1, PA, NP, M, and NS segments of HE30-1 were directly derived from H7N9 AIVs, whereas the NA (N3) and PB2 segments of HE30-1 were unrelated to zoonotic H7N9. Experimental infection revealed that HE30-1 was lethal in chickens but not in domestic or mallard ducks. HE30-1 was shed from and replicated in domestic and mallard ducks and chickens, whereas previous zoonotic H7N9 AIVs have not adapted well to ducks. This finding suggests the possibility that HE30-1 may disseminate to remote area by wild bird migration once it establishes in wild bird population. A hemagglutination-inhibition assay indicated that antigenic drift has occurred among the reassortants of zoonotic H7N9 AIVs; HE30-1 showed similar antigenicity to some of those H7N9 AIVs, suggesting it might be prevented by the H5/H7 inactivated vaccine that was introduced in China in 2017. Our study reports the emergence of a new reassortant of zoonotic H7N9 AIVs with novel viral characteristics and warns of the challenge we still face to control the zoonotic H7N9 AIVs and their reassortants.

This article is protected by copyright. All rights reserved.

KEYWORDS: adaptation to ducks; animal experiments; novel H7N3 reassortant; zoonotic H7N9 avian influenza viruses

PMID: 31293102 DOI: 10.1111/tbed.13291

Keywords: Avian Influenza; H7N3; H7N9; Reassortant strain; Animal models.

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#Avian #Influenza #H5N6 Viruses Exhibit Differing #Pathogenicities and #Transmissibilities in #Mammals (Sci Rep., abstract)

[Source: US National Library of Medicine, full page: (LINK). Abstract, edited.]

Sci Rep. 2017 Nov 24;7(1):16280. doi: 10.1038/s41598-017-16139-1.

Avian Influenza H5N6 Viruses Exhibit Differing Pathogenicities and Transmissibilities in Mammals.

Zhao Z1, Guo Z1, Zhang C1, Liu L1, Chen L2, Zhang C2, Wang Z1, Fu Y1, Li J1, Shao H3, Luo Q4, Qian J5, Liu L6.

Author information: 1 Institute of Military Veterinary, Academy of Military Medical Sciences, 666 West Liuying Road, Changchun, 130122, Jilin, China. 2 College of Veterinary Medicine, Hebei Agricultural University, 2596 lucky south street, Baoding, 071000, Hebei, China. 3 Key Laboratory of Prevention and Control Agents for Animal Bacteriosis, Institute of Animal Husbandry and Veterinary, Hubei Academy of Agricultural Sciences, Wuhan, China. 4 Key Laboratory of Prevention and Control Agents for Animal Bacteriosis, Institute of Animal Husbandry and Veterinary, Hubei Academy of Agricultural Sciences, Wuhan, China. qingping0523@163.com. 5 Institute of Military Veterinary, Academy of Military Medical Sciences, 666 West Liuying Road, Changchun, 130122, Jilin, China. qianj1970@126.com. 6 Institute of Military Veterinary, Academy of Military Medical Sciences, 666 West Liuying Road, Changchun, 130122, Jilin, China. liulinna7@126.com.

Erratum in Author Correction: Avian Influenza H5N6 Viruses Exhibit Differing Pathogenicities and Transmissibilities in Mammals. [Sci Rep. 2018]

 

Abstract

Since 2013, highly pathogenic avian influenza H5N6 viruses have emerged in poultry and caused sporadic infections in humans, increasing global concerns regarding their potential as human pandemic threats. Here, we characterized the receptor-binding specificities, pathogenicities and transmissibilities of three H5N6 viruses isolated from poultry in China. The surface genes hemagglutinin (HA) and neuraminidase (NA) were closely related to the human-originating strain A/Changsha/1/2014 (H5N6). Phylogenetic analyses showed that the HA genes were clustered in the 2.3.4.4 clade, and the NA genes were derived from H6N6 viruses. These H5N6 viruses bound both α-2,3-linked and α-2,6-linked sialic acid receptors, but they exhibited different pathogenicities in mice. In addition, one virus was fully infective and transmissible by direct contact in guinea pigs. These results highlight the importance of monitoring the continual adaptation of H5N6 viruses in poultry due to their potential threat to human health.

PMID: 29176564 PMCID: PMC5701206 DOI: 10.1038/s41598-017-16139-1 [Indexed for MEDLINE]  Free PMC Article

Keywords: Avian Influenza; H5N6; H6N6; Reassortant strain; Poultry; Human; Animal models.

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A case of #reassortant seasonal #influenza A(#H1N2) virus, #Denmark, April 2019 (Euro Surveill., abstract)

[Source: Eurosurveillance, full page: (LINK). Abstract, edited.]

A case of reassortant seasonal influenza A(H1N2) virus, Denmark, April 2019

Ramona Trebbien1, Anders Koch2, Lene Nielsen3, Dår Kristian Kur4, Pontus Westerström5, Tyra Grove Krause2

Affiliations: 1 National Influenza Center, Statens Serum Institut, Copenhagen, Denmark; 2 Department of Infectious Disease Epidemiology and Prevention, Statens Serum Institut, Copenhagen, Denmark; 3 Department of Clinical Microbiology, Herlev Hospital, Copenhagen University, Herlev, Denmark; 4 Department of Clinical Biochemistry, North Zealand Hospital, Hillerød, Denmark; 5 Department of Pulmonary and Infectious Diseases, North Zealand Hospital, Hillerød, Denmark

Correspondence:  Ramona Trebbien

Citation style for this article: Trebbien Ramona, Koch Anders, Nielsen Lene, Kur Dår Kristian, Westerström Pontus, Krause Tyra Grove. A case of reassortant seasonal influenza A(H1N2) virus, Denmark, April 2019. Euro Surveill. 2019;24(27):pii=1900406. https://doi.org/10.2807/1560-7917.ES.2019.24.27.1900406

Received: 21 Jun 2019;   Accepted: 03 Jul 2019

 

Abstract

A reassortant influenza A subtype H1N2 virus with gene segments from seasonal A(H1N1)pdm09 virus (HA, MP, NP, NS, PA, PB1 and PB2) and seasonal A(H3N2) virus (NA) was identified in a routine surveillance sample in Denmark. The patient recovered fully. This is the second reassortant influenza A(H1N2) virus identified in Europe in the 2018/19 influenza season, with the first case being detected December 2018 in Sweden.

©  This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License.

Keywords: Seasonal Influenza; H1N1pdm09; H3N2; H1N2; Reassortant strain; Human; Denmark.

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Will #China’s #H7N9 #Control #Strategy Continue to Be Effective? (Open Forum Infect Dis., abstract)

[Source: US National Library of Medicine, full page: (LINK). Abstract, edited.]

Open Forum Infect Dis. 2019 May 31;6(6):ofz258. doi: 10.1093/ofid/ofz258. eCollection 2019 Jun.

Will China’s H7N9 Control Strategy Continue to Be Effective?

Wang GL1, Gray GC2,3,4, Chen JM5, Ma MJ1.

Author information: 1 State Key Laboratory of Pathogen and Biosecurity, Beijing Institute of Microbiology and Epidemiology, Beijing, P. R. China. 2 Division of Infectious Diseases, School of Medicine, Global Health Institute, Duke University, Durham, North Carolina. 3 Global Health Research Center, Duke-Kunshan University, Kunshan, P. R. China. 4 Program in Emerging Infectious Diseases, Duke-NUS Medical School, Singapore. 5 China Animal Health and Epidemiology Center, Ministry of Agriculture, Qingdao, P. R. China.

 

Abstract

Since the first outbreak of avian influenza A(H7N9) virus in China in early 2013, several interventions to control the transmission of H7N9 virus from poultry to humans have been implemented. Temporarily closing live poultry markets reduced the risk of human infection to an extent, but it did not prevent the spread of the H7N9 virus among poultry, and this spread eventually led to more human cases. Nevertheless, the mass vaccination of poultry after September 2017 has been highly effective in preventing the H7N9 virus infection in both poultry and humans. In light of the emergence of highly pathogenic H7N9 and H7N2 viruses in unimmunized ducks, vaccination among poultry, especially for ducks, should be accompanied with continued surveillance of H7N9 variants and other avian influenza A viruses that could signal a heightened pandemic risk.

KEYWORDS: H7N9 viruses; avian influenza viruses; interventions; vaccination

PMID: 31263734 PMCID: PMC6592408 DOI: 10.1093/ofid/ofz258

Keywords: Avian Influenza; H7N9; H7N2; Reassortant Strain; Poultry; China; Vaccines.

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Clade 2.3.4.4 #H5 North #American Highly Pathogenic #Avian #Influenza Viruses Infect, but Do Not Cause #Clinical Signs in, American Black #Ducks (Anas rubripes) (Avian Dis., abstract)

[Source: US National Library of Medicine, full page: (LINK). Abstract, edited.]

Avian Dis. 2019 Jan 18;63(2):366-370. doi: 10.1637/11950-081418-ResNote.1.

Clade 2.3.4.4 H5 North American Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza Viruses Infect, but Do Not Cause Clinical Signs in, American Black Ducks (Anas rubripes).

Spackman E1, Prosser DJ2, Pantin-Jackwood M3, Stephens CB3, Berlin AM2.

Author information: 1 Southeast Poultry Research Laboratory, United States National Poultry Research Center, United States Department of Agriculture, Agricultural Research Service, Athens, GA 30605, erica.spackman@ars.usda.gov. 2 Patuxent Wildlife Research Center, United States Geological Survey, Laurel, MD 20708. 3 Southeast Poultry Research Laboratory, United States National Poultry Research Center, United States Department of Agriculture, Agricultural Research Service, Athens, GA 30605.

 

Abstract in English, Spanish

Highly pathogenic avian influenza virus (HPAIV) from the goose/Guangdong/1996 clade 2.3.4.4 H5 lineage spread from Asia into North America in 2014, most likely by wild bird migrations. Although several variants of the virus were detected, H5N8 and H5N2 were the most widespread in North American wild birds and domestic poultry. In early 2015, the H5N2 virus spread through commercial poultry in the Midwest, and >50 million chickens and turkeys died or had to be culled. Related H5 HPAIVs are still endemic in much of the Eastern Hemisphere. The wild bird species that were involved with dissemination of the virus in North America are not known. Dabbling ducks, especially mallards (Anas platyrhynchos), typically have the highest detection rates for avian influenza viruses. To better characterize the wild avian species that could spread the virus, American black ducks (Anas rubripes), which are closely related to mallards, were challenged with the North American H5N2 and H5N8 index HPAIV isolates: A/Northern Pintail/WA/40964/2014 H5N2 and A/Gyrfalcon/WA/41088/2014 H5N8. Although the American black ducks could be infected with low doses of both isolates (≤102 50% egg infective doses), ducks shed the H5N2 longer than the H5N8 (10 vs. 7 days) and the titers of virus shed were higher. Although there were too few ducks available on which to draw definitive conclusions, this suggests that American black ducks could serve as a more efficient reservoir for the H5N2 virus than the H5N8 virus.

KEYWORDS: H5 influenza; avian virus; duck virus; highly pathogenic avian influenza virus

PMID: 31251539 DOI: 10.1637/11950-081418-ResNote.1

Keywords: Avian Influenza; H5N2; H5N8; Reassortant strain; Wild Birds; USA.

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Development of #American-Lineage #Influenza #H5N2 #Reassortant #Vaccine Viruses for #Pandemic #Preparedness (Viruses, abstract)

[Source: US National Library of Medicine, full page: (LINK). Abstract, edited.]

Viruses. 2019 Jun 11;11(6). pii: E543. doi: 10.3390/v11060543.

Development of American-Lineage Influenza H5N2 Reassortant Vaccine Viruses for Pandemic Preparedness.

Chen PL1,2, Hu AY3, Lin CY4, Weng TC5, Lai CC6,7, Tseng YF8, Cheng MC9,10, Chia MY11,12, Lin WC13, Yeh CT14, Su IJ15, Lee MS16.

Author information: 1 National Institution of Infectious Diseases and Vaccinology, National Health Research Institutes (NHRI), Zhunan, Miaoli 35053, Taiwan. letitia@nhri.org.tw. 2 Institute of Molecular and Cellular Biology, National Tsing Hua University, Hsinchu 30013, Taiwan. letitia@nhri.org.tw. 3 National Institution of Infectious Diseases and Vaccinology, National Health Research Institutes (NHRI), Zhunan, Miaoli 35053, Taiwan. alanhu@nhri.org.tw. 4 National Institution of Infectious Diseases and Vaccinology, National Health Research Institutes (NHRI), Zhunan, Miaoli 35053, Taiwan. grayingaries@outlook.com. 5 National Institution of Infectious Diseases and Vaccinology, National Health Research Institutes (NHRI), Zhunan, Miaoli 35053, Taiwan. wtc@nhri.org.tw. 6 National Institution of Infectious Diseases and Vaccinology, National Health Research Institutes (NHRI), Zhunan, Miaoli 35053, Taiwan. laicc2@nhri.org.tw. 7 College of Life Science, National Tsing Hua University, Hsinchu 30013, Taiwan. laicc2@nhri.org.tw. 8 National Institution of Infectious Diseases and Vaccinology, National Health Research Institutes (NHRI), Zhunan, Miaoli 35053, Taiwan. yufents@gmail.com. 9 Department of Veterinary Medicine, College of Veterinary Medicine, National Pingtung University of Science and Technology, Pingtung 91201, Taiwan. mccheng@mail.npust.edu.tw. 10 Animal Health Research Institutes, Danshui, New Taipei City 25158, Taiwan. mccheng@mail.npust.edu.tw. 11 National Institution of Infectious Diseases and Vaccinology, National Health Research Institutes (NHRI), Zhunan, Miaoli 35053, Taiwan. chiaminyuan@dragon.nchu.edu.tw. 12 Department of Veterinary Medicine, National Chung Hsing University, Taichung 40227, Taiwan. chiaminyuan@dragon.nchu.edu.tw. 13 Institute of Preventive Medicine, National Defence Medical Centre, Taipei 23742, Taiwan. spps057@gmail.com. 14 Institute of Preventive Medicine, National Defence Medical Centre, Taipei 23742, Taiwan. yyhome@mail.ndmctsgh.edu.tw. 15 National Institution of Infectious Diseases and Vaccinology, National Health Research Institutes (NHRI), Zhunan, Miaoli 35053, Taiwan. suihjen0704@stust.edu.tw. 16 National Institution of Infectious Diseases and Vaccinology, National Health Research Institutes (NHRI), Zhunan, Miaoli 35053, Taiwan. minshi@nhri.org.tw.

 

Abstract

Novel low-pathogenic avian influenza (LPAI) H5N2 viruses hit poultry farms in Taiwan in 2003, and evolved into highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) viruses in 2010. These viruses are reassortant viruses containing HA and NA genes from American-lineage H5N2 and six internal genes from local H6N1 viruses. According to a serological survey, the Taiwan H5N2 viruses can cause asymptomatic infections in poultry workers. Therefore, a development of influenza H5N2 vaccines is desirable for pandemic preparation. In this study, we employed reverse genetics to generate a vaccine virus having HA and NA genes from A/Chicken/CY/A2628/2012 (E7, LPAI) and six internal genes from a Vero cell-adapted high-growth H5N1 vaccine virus (Vero-15). The reassortant H5N2 vaccine virus, E7-V15, presented high-growth efficiency in Vero cells (512 HAU, 107.6 TCID50/mL), and passed all tests for qualification of candidate vaccine viruses. In ferret immunization, two doses of inactivated whole virus antigens (3 μg of HA protein) adjuvanted with alum could induce robust antibody response (HI titre 113.14). In conclusion, we have established reverse genetics to generate a qualified reassortant H5N2 vaccine virus for further development.

KEYWORDS: American-lineage H5N2 vaccine; American-lineage reassortant influenza viruses; Pandemic preparedness

PMID: 31212631 DOI: 10.3390/v11060543

Keywords: Avian Influenza; H5N1; H5N2; H6N1; Reassortant Strain; Vaccines.

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