#MERS #Coronavirus #Transmission (Emerg Infect Dis., abstract)

[Source: US Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), Emerging Infectious Diseases Journal, full page: (LINK). Abstract, edited.]

Volume 26, Number 2—February 2020 / Perspective

Middle East Respiratory Syndrome Coronavirus Transmission

Marie E. Killerby  , Holly M. Biggs, Claire M. Midgley, Susan I. Gerber, and John T. Watson

Author affiliations: Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Atlanta, Georgia, USA

 

Abstract

Middle East respiratory syndrome coronavirus (MERS-CoV) infection causes a spectrum of respiratory illness, from asymptomatic to mild to fatal. MERS-CoV is transmitted sporadically from dromedary camels to humans and occasionally through human-to-human contact. Current epidemiologic evidence supports a major role in transmission for direct contact with live camels or humans with symptomatic MERS, but only limited evidence supports the possibility of transmission from camel products or asymptomatic MERS cases. Because a proportion of case-patients do not report direct contact with camels or with persons who have symptomatic MERS, further research is needed to conclusively determine additional mechanisms of transmission, to inform public health practice, and to refine current precautionary recommendations.

Keywords: MERS-CoV; Human; Camels.

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#Enzootic #patterns of #MERS #coronavirus in imported #African and local #Arabian dromedary #camels: a prospective genomic study (Lancet Planet Health, abstract)

[Source: US National Library of Medicine, full page: (LINK). Abstract, edited.]

Lancet Planet Health. 2019 Dec 11. pii: S2542-5196(19)30243-8. doi: 10.1016/S2542-5196(19)30243-8. [Epub ahead of print]

Enzootic patterns of Middle East respiratory syndrome coronavirus in imported African and local Arabian dromedary camels: a prospective genomic study.

El-Kafrawy SA1, Corman VM2, Tolah AM3, Al Masaudi SB4, Hassan AM5, Müller MA6, Bleicker T7, Harakeh SM1, Alzahrani AA8, Alsaaidi GA8, Alagili AN9, Hashem AM10, Zumla A11, Drosten C12, Azhar EI13.

Author information: 1 Special Infectious Agent Unit, King Fahd Medical Research Center, King Abdulaziz University, Jeddah, Saudi Arabia; Department of Medical Laboratory Technology, Faculty of Applied Medical Sciences, King Abdulaziz University, Jeddah, Saudi Arabia. 2 Charité-Universitätsmedizin Berlin, corporate member of Freie Universität Berlin, Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin, Germany; Berlin Institute of Health, Institute of Virology, Berlin, Germany; German Centre for Infection Research, associated partner Charité, Berlin, Germany. 3 Special Infectious Agent Unit, King Fahd Medical Research Center, King Abdulaziz University, Jeddah, Saudi Arabia; Department of Biological Science, Division of Microbiology, Faculty of Science, King Abdulaziz University, Jeddah, Saudi Arabia. 4 Department of Biological Science, Division of Microbiology, Faculty of Science, King Abdulaziz University, Jeddah, Saudi Arabia. 5 Special Infectious Agent Unit, King Fahd Medical Research Center, King Abdulaziz University, Jeddah, Saudi Arabia. 6 Charité-Universitätsmedizin Berlin, corporate member of Freie Universität Berlin, Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin, Germany; Berlin Institute of Health, Institute of Virology, Berlin, Germany; German Centre for Infection Research, associated partner Charité, Berlin, Germany; Martsinovsky Institute of Medical Parasitology, Tropical and Vector Borne Diseases, Sechenov University, Moscow, Russia. 7 Charité-Universitätsmedizin Berlin, corporate member of Freie Universität Berlin, Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin, Germany; Berlin Institute of Health, Institute of Virology, Berlin, Germany. 8 Directorate of Agriculture, Ministry of Environment Water and Agriculture, Makkah Region, Saudi Arabia. 9 Mammals Research Chair, Department of Zoology, College of Science, King Saud University, Riyadh, Saudi Arabia. 10 Special Infectious Agent Unit, King Fahd Medical Research Center, King Abdulaziz University, Jeddah, Saudi Arabia; Department of Medical Microbiology and Parasitology, Faculty of Medicine, King Abdulaziz University, Jeddah, Saudi Arabia. 11 Department of Infection, Division of Infection and Immunity, Centre for Clinical Microbiology, University College London, London, UK; NIHR Biomedical Research Centre, University College London Hospitals, London, UK. 12 Charité-Universitätsmedizin Berlin, corporate member of Freie Universität Berlin, Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin, Germany; Berlin Institute of Health, Institute of Virology, Berlin, Germany; German Centre for Infection Research, associated partner Charité, Berlin, Germany. Electronic address: christian.drosten@charite.de. 13 Special Infectious Agent Unit, King Fahd Medical Research Center, King Abdulaziz University, Jeddah, Saudi Arabia; Department of Medical Laboratory Technology, Faculty of Applied Medical Sciences, King Abdulaziz University, Jeddah, Saudi Arabia. Electronic address: eazhar@kau.edu.sa.

 

Abstract

BACKGROUND:

The Middle East respiratory syndrome coronavirus (MERS-CoV) is a lethal zoonotic pathogen endemic to the Arabian Peninsula. Dromedary camels are a likely source of infection and the virus probably originated in Africa. We studied the genetic diversity, geographical structure, infection prevalence, and age-associated prevalence among camels at the largest entry port of camels from Africa into the Arabian Peninsula.

METHODS:

In this prospective genomic study, we took nasal samples from camels imported from Sudan and Djibouti into the Port of Jeddah in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia, over an almost 2-year period and local Arabian camels over 2 months in the year after surveillance of the port. We determined the prevalence of MERS-CoV infection, age-associated patterns of infection, and undertook phylogeographical and migration analyses to determine intercountry virus transmission after local lineage establishment. We compared all virological characteristics between the local and imported cohorts. We compared major gene deletions between African and Arabian strains of the virus. Reproductive numbers were inferred with Bayesian birth death skyline analyses.

FINDINGS:

Between Aug 10, 2016, and May 3, 2018, we collected samples from 1196 imported camels, of which 868 originated from Sudan and 328 from Djibouti, and between May 1, and June 25, 2018, we collected samples from 472 local camels, of which 189 were from Riyadh and 283 were from Jeddah, Saudi Arabia. Virus prevalence was higher in local camels than in imported camels (224 [47·5%] of 472 vs 157 [13·1%] of 1196; p<0·0001). Infection prevalence peaked among camels older than 1 year and aged up to 2 years in both groups, with 255 (66·9%) of 381 positive cases in this age group. Although the overall geographical distribution of the virus corresponded with the phylogenetic tree topology, some virus exchange was observed between countries corresponding with trade routes in the region. East and west African strains of the virus appear to be geographically separated, with an origin of west African strains in east Africa. African strains of the virus were not re-sampled in Saudi Arabia despite sampling approximately 1 year after importation from Africa. All local Arabian samples contained strains of the virus that belong to a novel recombinant clade (NRC) first detected in 2014 in Saudi Arabia. Reproduction number estimates informed by the sequences suggest sustained endemicity of NRC, with a mean Re of 1·16.

INTERPRETATION:

Despite frequent imports of MERS-CoV with camels from Africa, African lineages of MERS-CoV do not establish themselves in Saudi Arabia. Arabian strains of the virus should be tested for changes in virulence and transmissibility.

FUNDING:

German Ministry of Research and Education, EU Horizon 2020, and Emerging Diseases Clinical Trials Partnership.

Copyright © 2019 The Author(s). Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an Open Access article under the CC BY 4.0 license. Published by Elsevier Ltd.. All rights reserved.

PMID: 31843456 DOI: 10.1016/S2542-5196(19)30243-8

Keywords: MERS-CoV; Camels; Africa Region; Saudi Arabia; Recombination.

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#Genetic #diversity of #MERS-CoV spike protein gene in #Saudi Arabia (J Infect Public Health, abstract)

[Source: US National Library of Medicine, full page: (LINK). Abstract, edited.]

J Infect Public Health. 2019 Dec 9. pii: S1876-0341(19)30345-4. doi: 10.1016/j.jiph.2019.11.007. [Epub ahead of print]

Genetic diversity of MERS-CoV spike protein gene in Saudi Arabia.

Sohrab SS1, Azhar EI2.

Author information: 1 Special Infectious Agents Unit, King Fahd Medical Research Center, King Abdulaziz University, Jeddah, 21589, Saudi Arabia; Medical Laboratory Technology Department, Faculty of Applied Medical Sciences, King Abdulaziz University, Jeddah, 21589, Saudi Arabia. Electronic address: ssohrab@kau.edu.sa. 2 Special Infectious Agents Unit, King Fahd Medical Research Center, King Abdulaziz University, Jeddah, 21589, Saudi Arabia; Medical Laboratory Technology Department, Faculty of Applied Medical Sciences, King Abdulaziz University, Jeddah, 21589, Saudi Arabia.

 

Abstract

BACKGROUND:

Middle East respiratory syndrome coronavirus (MERS-CoV) was primarily detected in 2012 and still causing disease in human and camel. Camel and bats have been identified as a potential source of virus for disease spread to human. Although, significant information related to MERS-CoV disease, spread, infection, epidemiology, clinical features have been published, A little information is available on the sequence diversity of Spike protein gene. The Spike protein gene plays a significant role in virus attachment to host cells. Recently, the information about recombinant MERS-CoV has been published. So, this work was designed to identify the emergence of any another recombinant virus in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia.

METHODS:

In this study samples were collected from both human and camels and the Spike protein gene was amplified and sequenced. The nucleotide and amino acid sequences of MERS-CoV Spike protein gene were used to analyze the recombination, genetic diversity and phylogenetic relationship with selected sequences from Saudi Arabia.

RESULTS:

The nucleotide sequence identity ranged from 65.7% to 99.8% among all the samples collected from human and camels from various locations in the Kingdom. The lowest similarity (65.7%) was observed in samples from Madinah and Dammam. The phylogenetic relationship formed different clusters with multiple isolates from various locations. The sample collected from human in Jeddah hospital formed a closed cluster with human samples collected from Buraydah, while camel sample formed a closed cluster with Hufuf isolates. The phylogenetic tree by using Aminoacid sequences formed closed cluster with Dammam, Makkah and Duba isolates. The amino acid sequences variations were observed in 28/35 samples and two unique amino acid sequences variations were observed in all samples analyzed while total 19 nucleotides sequences variations were observed in the Spike protein gene. The minor recombination events were identified in eight different sequences at various hotspots in both human and camel samples using recombination detection programme.

CONCLUSION:

The generated information from this study is very valuable and it will be used to design and develop therapeutic compounds and vaccine to control the MERS-CoV disease spread in not only in the Kingdom but also globally.

Copyright © 2019 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd.. All rights reserved.

KEYWORDS: Camel; Genetic diversity; Human; MERS-CoV; Saudi Arabia

PMID: 31831395 DOI: 10.1016/j.jiph.2019.11.007

Keywords: MERS-CoV; Human; Camels; Recombination; Saudi Arabia.

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#Influenza A Virus #Infections in Dromedary #Camels, #Nigeria and #Ethiopia, 2015–2017 (Emerg Infect Dis., abstract)

[Source: US Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), Emerging Infectious Diseases Journal, full page: (LINK). Abstract, edited.]

Volume 26, Number 1—January 2020 / Research Letter

Influenza A Virus Infections in Dromedary Camels, Nigeria and Ethiopia, 2015–2017

Daniel K.W. Chu1, Ranawaka A.P.M. Perera1, Abraham Ali1, Jamiu O. Oladipo, Gezahegne Mamo, Ray T.Y. So, Ziqi Zhou, Yen Yeen Chor, Chak Kai Chan, Desalegn Belay, Adamu Tayachew, Mesfin Mengesha, Feyesa Regassa, Nga Ting Lam, Leo L.M. Poon, and Malik Peiris

Author affiliations: The University of Hong Kong, Hong Kong, China (D.K.W. Chu, R.A.P.M. Perera, J.O. Oladipo, R.T.Y. So, Z. Zhou, Y.Y. Chor, C.K. Chan, N.T. Lam, L.L.M. Poon, M. Peiris); Ethiopian Public Health Institute, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia (A. Ali, D. Belay, A. Tayachew, M. Mengesha, F. Regassa); Addis Ababa University, Bishoftu, Ethiopia (G. Mamo)

 

Abstract

We examined nasal swabs and serum samples acquired from dromedary camels in Nigeria and Ethiopia during 2015–2017 for evidence of influenza virus infection. We detected antibodies against influenza A(H1N1) and A(H3N2) viruses and isolated an influenza A(H1N1)pdm09–like virus from a camel in Nigeria. Influenza surveillance in dromedary camels is needed.

Keywords: Influenza A; H1N1pdm09; H3N2; Camels; Nigeria; Ethiopia.

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Molecular basis of binding between #MERS-CoV and CD26s from seven #bat species (J Virol., abstract)

[Source: Journal of Virology, full page: (LINK). Abstract, edited.]

Molecular basis of binding between MERS-CoV and CD26s from seven bat species

Yuan Yuan, Jianxun Qi, Ruchao Peng, Chunrui Li, Guangwen Lu, Jinghua Yan, Qihui Wang, George Fu Gao

DOI: 10.1128/JVI.01387-19

 

ABSTRACT

Continued reports of Middle East respiratory syndrome coronavirus (MERS-CoV) infecting human have occurred since its identification in 2012. MERS-CoV is prone to cause endemic disease in the Middle East, with several dozens of spill-over infections to other continents. It is hypothesized that MERS-CoV originated from bat coronaviruses and that dromedary camels are its natural reservoir. Although gene segments identical to MERS-CoV were sequenced from certain species of bats, and one species experimentally shed the virus, it is still unknown whether other bats can transmit the virus. Here, at the molecular level, we found that all purified bat CD26s (bCD26s) from a diverse range of species interact with the receptor binding domain (RBD) of MERS-CoV, with KD values ranging from several to hundreds of micromolar level. Moreover, all bCD26s expressed in this study mediated the entry of pseudotyped MERS-CoV to receptor-expressing cells, indicating the broad potential engagement of bCD26s as MERS-CoV receptors. Further structural analysis indicated that in the bat receptor, compared to the human receptor, substitutions of key residues and their adjacent amino acids leads to decreased binding affinity to the MERS-RBD. These results add more evidence to the existing belief that bats are the original source of MERS-CoV and suggest that bCD26s in many species can mediate the entry of the virus, which has significant implications for the surveillance and control of MERS-CoV infection.

 

Importance

In this study, we found that bat CD26s (bCD26s) from different species exhibit large diversities, especially in the region responsible for binding to the receptor binding domain of Middle East respiratory syndrome coronavirus (MERS-CoV). However, they maintain the interaction with MERS-RBD at varied affinities and support the entry of pseudotyped MERS-CoV. These bat receptors polymorphisms seem to confer evolutionary pressure for the adaptation of CD26-binding virus, such as the ancestor of MERS-CoV, and led to the generation of diversified CD26-engaging CoV strains. Thus, our data add more evidence to support that bats are the reservoir of MERS-CoV and similar viruses, as well as further emphasize the necessity to survey MERS-CoV and other CoVs among bats.

Copyright © 2019 American Society for Microbiology. All Rights Reserved.

Keywords: Coronavirus; Bats; Camels; MERS-CoV.

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Humoral #Immunogenicity and Efficacy of a Single Dose of ChAdOx1 #MERS #Vaccine Candidate in Dromedary #Camels (Sci Rep., abstract)

[Source: US National Library of Medicine, full page: (LINK). Abstract, edited.]

Sci Rep. 2019 Nov 8;9(1):16292. doi: 10.1038/s41598-019-52730-4.

Humoral Immunogenicity and Efficacy of a Single Dose of ChAdOx1 MERS Vaccine Candidate in Dromedary Camels.

Alharbi NK1,2, Qasim I3, Almasoud A4, Aljami HA4, Alenazi MW4, Alhafufi A3, Aldibasi OS5, Hashem AM6,7, Kasem S3,8, Albrahim R3, Aldubaib M9, Almansour A3, Temperton NJ10, Kupke A11,12, Becker S11,12, Abu-Obaidah A3, Alkarar A3, Yoon IK13, Azhar E14,15, Lambe T16, Bayoumi F3, Aldowerij A3, Ibrahim OH3, Gilbert SC16, Balkhy HH4,17,18.

Author information: 1 Department of Infectious Disease Research, King Abdullah International Medical Research Center, Riyadh, Saudi Arabia. harbina2@ngha.med.sa. 2 King Saud bin Abdulaziz University for Health Sciences, Riyadh, Saudi Arabia. harbina2@ngha.med.sa. 3 Ministry of Environment, Water and Agriculture (MEWA), Riyadh, Saudi Arabia. 4 Department of Infectious Disease Research, King Abdullah International Medical Research Center, Riyadh, Saudi Arabia. 5 Department of Bioinformatics and Biostatistics, King Abdullah International Medical Research Center, Riyadh, Saudi Arabia. 6 Department of Medical Microbiology and Parasitology, Faculty of Medicine, King Abdulaziz University, Jeddah, Saudi Arabia. 7 Vaccines and Immunotherapy Unit, King Fahd Medical Research Center, King Abdulaziz University, Jeddah, Saudi Arabia. 8 Department of Virology, Faculty of Veterinary Medicine, Kafrelsheikh University, Kafrelsheikh, El Geish Street, 33516, Egypt. 9 College of Agriculture and Veterinary Medicine, Qassim University, Qassim, Saudi Arabia. 10 Viral Pseudotype Unit, Medway School of Pharmacy, University of Kent, Chatham, Kent, ME4 4TB, United Kingdom. 11 Institute of Virology, Philipps University of Marburg, Marburg, Germany. 12 German Center for Infection Research (DZIF), Partner Site Gieβen-Marburg-Langen, Germany. 13 International Vaccine Institute, Seoul, South Korea. 14 Department of Medical Laboratory Technology, Faculty of Applied Medical Sciences, King Abdulaziz University, Jeddah, Saudi Arabia. 15 Special Infectious Agents Unit, King Fahd Medical Research Center, King Abdulaziz University, Jeddah, Saudi Arabia. 16 The Jenner Institute, University of Oxford, Oxford, OX3 7DQ, UK. 17 King Saud bin Abdulaziz University for Health Sciences, Riyadh, Saudi Arabia. 18 Department of Infection Prevention and Control, Ministry of National Guard – Health Affairs, Riyadh, Saudi Arabia.

 

Abstract

MERS-CoV seronegative and seropositive camels received a single intramuscular dose of ChAdOx1 MERS, a replication-deficient adenoviral vectored vaccine expressing MERS-CoV spike protein, with further groups receiving control vaccinations. Infectious camels with active naturally acquired MERS-CoV infection, were co-housed with the vaccinated camels at a ratio of 1:2 (infected:vaccinated); nasal discharge and virus titres were monitored for 14 days. Overall, the vaccination reduced virus shedding and nasal discharge (p = 0.0059 and p = 0.0274, respectively). Antibody responses in seropositive camels were enhancedby the vaccine; these camels had a higher average age than seronegative. Older seronegative camels responded more strongly to vaccination than younger animals; and neutralising antibodies were detected in nasal swabs. Further work is required to optimise vaccine regimens for younger seronegative camels.

PMID: 31705137 DOI: 10.1038/s41598-019-52730-4

Keywords: MERS-CoV; Camels; Vaccines.

—–

#MERS #Coronavirus #Seropositivity in #Camel #Handlers and Their #Families, #Pakistan (Emerg Infect Dis., abstract)

[Source: US Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), Emerging Infectious Diseases Journal, full page: (LINK). Abstract, edited.]

Volume 25, Number 12—December 2019 / Dispatch

Middle East Respiratory Syndrome Coronavirus Seropositivity in Camel Handlers and Their Families, Pakistan

Jian Zheng1, Sohail Hassan1  , Abdulaziz N. Alagaili, Abeer N. Alshukairi, Nabil M.S. Amor, Nadia Mukhtar, Iqra Maleeha Nazeer, Zarfishan Tahir, Nadeem Akhter, Stanley Perlman  , and Tahir Yaqub

Author affiliations: University of Iowa, Iowa City, Iowa, USA (J. Zheng, S. Perlman); University of Veterinary and Animal Sciences, Lahore, Pakistan (S. Hassan, I.M. Nazeer, T. Yaqub); King Saud University, Riyadh, Saudi Arabia (A.N. Alagaili, N.M.S. Amor); King Faisal Specialist Hospital and Research Centre, Jeddah, Saudi Arabia (A.N. Alshukairi); Government of Punjab, Lahore (N. Mukhtar, Z. Tahir, N. Akhter); The First Affiliated Hospital of Guangzhou Medical University, Guangzhou, China (S. Perlman)

 

Abstract

A high percentage of camel handlers in Saudi Arabia are seropositive for Middle East respiratory syndrome coronavirus. We found that 12/100 camel handlers and their family members in Pakistan, a country with extensive camel MERS-CoV infection, were seropositive, indicating that MERS-CoV infection of these populations extends beyond the Arabian Peninsula.

Keywords: MERS-CoV; Serology; Seroprevalence; Human; Camels; Pakistan.

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